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Abstract
The aim of this study was to assess if the experience of role-taking improved the 
interpersonal understanding of two young male adults with Asperger’s syndrome. The 
research methodology involved the use of the computer program called ‘Bubble Dialogue’1 
which presents the beginning of a dialogue between two on-screen protagonists. The 
participants and I progressed through six theory of mind inspired scenarios in which we 
continued the dialogues by assuming the characters’ roles. The characters we played 
communicated through the text we typed into speech and thought bubbles above our 
characters’ heads. The research aims were to improve the social understanding of adults with 
Asperger’s syndrome and investigate and describe the nature of autistic thought and speech.
Before and after the Bubble Dialogue experience, the participants were tested with the 
Wisconsin Card Sort Test and the British Picture Vocabulary Scale. Additionally, their 
carers were interviewed using Frith, Happe and Siddons (1994) supplementary items for the 
Vineland Adaptive behavioural Scales to assess if the Bubble Dialogue experience improved 
the participants’ understanding of mental states in their everyday lives.
Two male adolescents with Emotional and Behavioural Difficulties (EBD) also completed all 
six scenarios. Thirty three raters, who were blind to the identities of the four participants, 
rated their and my (the experimenter’s) scripts along three dimensions: 1) emotionally 
charged to emotionally flat 2) polite to coarse and 3) pursuing a topic too little to pursing a 
topic too much.
Analysis revealed that the one of the adults with Asperger’s syndrome’s scripts were rated 
significantly more emotionally flat and the characters he played were rated as pursing a topic 
too little (relative to the characters I played) from the other three participants. And on the 
dimension polite to coarse, all the scripts were rated significantly different from each other 
apart from the two adolescents with EDB. These findings suggest that although both 
individuals with Asperger’s syndrome had the same diagnosis, one of them expressed speech 
and thought which was rated more similar to the two adolescents with EBD, at least on 
dimensions 1 and 3.
The findings from the battery of tests pre and post the Bubble Dialogue suggest that after the 
experience of the program there was i) no detectable improvement in the autistic participants’ 
interpersonal understanding ii) there was no increase in their in their overall cognitive 
function, but iii) there was improvement in their executive function. The implications of the 
results are discussed in relation to the theory of mind and executive function hypotheses of 
autism.
Keywords : Autism, Asperger’s syndrome, Theory of Mind, Computer, Bubble Dialogue.
1 Developed by the Language Development and Hypermedia Research Group, University of Ulster.
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Chapter 1
General background to Autism
For his trip to England, he dressed in his most comfortable suit. One suit is plenty, he 
counselled in his guidebooks, i f  you take along some travel-size packets o f  spot 
remover. (Macon knew every item that came in travel-size packets, from deodorant to 
shoe polish.). The suit should be a medium gray. Gray not only hides the dirt; it’s 
handy fo r  sudden funerals and other formal occasions. At the same time, it isn’t too 
sombre fo r  everyday.
(from The Accidental Tourist by Anne Tyler)
1.1 History
It was in 1908 that an eminent psychiatrist, Eugen Bleuler, first used the term 
‘autistic’ (from the Greek ‘autos’ meaning self). He used it to describe the social 
withdrawal seen in adults with Schizophrenia, their narrowing of relationships with 
people and the outside so extreme that it left only the person and their self. However 
it was not until the 1940’s that descriptions, of the disorder now known as autism, 
were first published. Before then individuals with autism existed but were probably 
given different diagnostic or cultural labels depending on where and in what period of 
history they lived. For example, the more intellectually able may have been labelled 
as ‘blessed fools’ in Tsarist Russia or ‘idiot savants’. Earlier this century, children
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with autism may have received the label of ‘Childhood Schizophrenia’. In today’s 
applied diagnostic classifications, schizophrenia is a label usually given to adults and 
only rarely does schizophrenia have an onset before late childhood.
Autism was almost simultaneously described by Leo Kanner in the United States of 
America, in 1943, and by Hans Asperger in Austria in 1944. Kanner and Asperger 
both believed this disorder was present from birth. They saw children who seemed 
unable to form normal emotional relationships with others, but unlike Bleuler’s 
schizophrenic adults, the children’s disturbance had an early onset.
Kanner called the condition ‘early infantile autism’ (which is perhaps a misleading 
term because it implies that autism does not continue into adulthood). Asperger 
described a more broadly defined condition which he called ‘autistic psychopathy’.
There is a great deal of overlap between both Kanner’s and Asperger’s descriptions of 
autism and some differences. Nowadays, the consensus seems to be that Kanner and 
Asperger described the same condition but their experience was with individuals at 
different developmental stages. For example, a child with a Kanner-type diagnosis 
may develop into an Asperger-type adolescent.
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1.2 K anner’s cardinal features
Kanner and Eisenberg (1956) selected five features they believed were characteristic 
of all the children Kanner saw. To this day, these features form the basis of the 
diagnostic criteria for autism. The disorder was not accepted into official diagnosis 
until the publication of DSM-III in 1980 (The third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistic Manual of the American Psychiatric Association. Currently, the most up-to- 
date version is DSM-IV).
Kanner’s own words appear in quotation marks, together with examples from my own 
clinical experiences.
1. Extreme autistic aloneness: "There is, from the start, an extreme autistic aloneness 
that, wherever possible, disregards, ignores, shuts out anything that comes to the child 
from outside". The parents of these children described them as "self-sufficient", "like 
in a shell", "acting as if people weren’t there", "happiest when alone". Kanner said 
the children neither sought nor seemed to want social contact and displayed this from 
an early age by not opening their arms out when being picked up and not moulding 
themselves to the body of the person holding them.
2. "An anxiously obsessive desire for the preservation of sameness": Kanner stated 
that these children became distressed by even minor changes in routine; e.g., taking a 
different route to school. He said they showed obsessive ritualistic behaviours in their 
everyday routines, such as taking their clothes off or putting them on in a particular
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sequence and became extremely challenging if the routine was not precisely adhered 
to. They engaged in repetitive activities; e.g., one young man I know likes to listen to 
the same music album over and over again.
3. Limitations in the variety o f spontaneous activity: These children showed a 
"fascination for objects" which they "handled with skill in fine motor movements"; 
e.g., spinning objects and completing sometimes complex jigsaw puzzles. However, 
they did not show much in the way of spontaneous activity. Instead they displayed 
repetitive verbalisation (e.g., asking one question over and over again), repetitive 
movements (e.g., stereotyped body rocking and hand flapping) and a narrow range of 
interests (e.g., wanting to listen to music by only one group all the time).
4. The "kind of language that does not seem intended to serve interpersonal 
communication"/ immediate or delayed echolalia: Some children repeated or echoed, 
with remarkable fidelity, what they had heard another person say either immediately 
(immediate echolalia) or sometime after (delayed echolalia).
For example:
Parent: What would you like for dinner?
Child: What would you like for dinner?
Additionally the children reversed pronouns, using ‘You’ to refer to themselves and 
T  to refer to the other person. Hence when they said "You want some biscuits?"
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They in fact meant that they wanted some biscuits.
Some children Kanner saw showed irregularities in the pitch and intonation of their 
spoken language and some were neologistic; i.e., not using words and phrases in their 
usual meaning. These idiosyncratic words or phrases were often associated with a 
past incident. For example, another young man known to me will still call birthday 
cards "jelly" because as a child he made an association between birthday cards and 
party food.
Children with some language comprehension, were over literal in their interpretations 
and failed to understand the underlying meaning of utterances. For example, a young 
woman with autism known to me becomes very distressed whenever she is told that 
she is going swimming. Until someone says to her "You are going swimming and 
you are coming back".
5. Good cognitive potentialities: Despite having severe learning disabilities, Kanner 
believed that the children had islets of superior ability. He believed they could utilise 
their excellent rote memories in a practical and applied way, if only they would, 
instead of memorising isolated and essentially meaningless pieces of information; e.g., 
bus timetables, weather forecasts. Kanner believed the children were being 
uncooperative rather than being unable to use their abilities.
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In his first paper on autism, Kanner wrote about additional features which included:
Odd responses to sensory stimuli: These children may show oversensitivity and 
become disturbed when exposed to crowd noises, vacuum cleaners, flashing or bright 
lights, etc. They may additionally show incredible tolerance to what the rest of us 
would consider severe pain. Some children may also show strong preferences for 
certain kinds of clothing materials, especially for items worn nearest the skin.
Destructiveness, aggression and outbursts: Frustration often related to their 
compulsion to maintain sameness, or frustration from their desperation to be 
understood, probably lead these children to destroy objects and injure themselves and 
others.
Unusual eating habits and problems with feeding: Kanner noticed that some children 
with autism were extremely selective about what they ate. While others ate almost 
anything and everything, including non-edible items.
Highly intelligent families: Kanner stated that the parents of the children he looked at 
were highly intellectual. This was probably due to an unrepresentative sample from 
referral bias. However other researchers have recently looked to see if an extension of 
the autistic phenotype exists in the families of individuals with autism. Bailey et al. 
(1995) stated that, in several studies, the first-degree relatives of individuals with 
autism, had an elevated rate of cognitive and social abnormalities. Baron-Cohen and
Hammer (in press) found that the parents of children with autism did better than 
controls on tests which individuals with autism are usually good at; e.g., visuo-spatial 
tasks such as the embedded figures and block design tests.
13 What causes autism?
There does not seem to be one single cause of autism, though there are a number of 
risk factors associated with the disorder. There is strong evidence, from twin and 
family studies, suggesting that genetics plays a role in determining who is autistic. 
Exactly what the mechanism of inheritance is remains unknown.
Twin studies show that monozygotic (identical) twins have a higher concordance rate 
for autism than dizygotic (fraternal) twins, 36% and 0% respectively (Folstein and 
Rutter, 1977). The rate rises to 82% and 10% when the phenotype was extended to 
look at concordance rates for autistic symptoms (Bailey et al., 1995). According to 
Bailey et al. (1995), the difference in concordance rates between MZ and DZ twins 
suggests that autism is a complex genetic trait which involves more than one genetic 
locus.
Folstein and Rutter (1979) state that siblings of an individual with autism are at 
greater risk of the syndrome than the general population. Nevertheless only 2-3% of 
the siblings actually exhibited autism in their study and only 3% in Bolten et al.’s 
(1994) family history study.
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In Bolten et al.’s (1994) study this figure rose to 6% of siblings, when the phenotype 
was extended to include more broadly defined pervasive developmental disorders 
(PDD) and Asperger’s syndrome.
(Davison and Neale (1994) state that in part to clarify the distinction between autism 
and Schizophrenia DSM III introduced, and DSM IV retained, the term Pervasive 
Developmental Disorders. In DSM IV, autism is one of several PDD; the others being 
Rett’s disorder, Child Disintegrative disorder and Asperger’s syndrome).
The figure rose to 20% of siblings when their broadest definition of lesser variant 
autism (e.g. reading difficulties that just occurred in childhood, or social impairments 
that first emerged in adolescence/adult life) was included. In contrast 0%, 0% and 3% 
exhibited autism, PDD/Asperger’s syndrome, or lesser variant autism respectively in 
the control group (siblings of individuals with Down’s syndrome).
1.4 How common is Autism?
The recorded incidence of autism depends heavily on how it is defined and diagnosed 
(Happe, 1994). Autism is a relatively rare disorder with epidemiological studies 
suggesting a prevalence of between 2 and 10 per 10 000 births. These studies also 
show a higher ratio of males to females, with approximately 5 boys to every 2 girl; 
this ratio increases to as high as 15:1 (Newson, Dawson and Everard, 1984) as one 
moves along the autistic spectrum to include the more able individuals.
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Skuse et al. (1997) looked at girls with Turner’s syndrome and uses evidence from his 
study to suggest an account of why males are more vulnerable to developmental 
disorders, such as autism.
Turner’s syndrome is a genetic disorder which affects girls only. It is a disorder 
which results from part or all of one X chromosome being deleted. (All ‘normal’ 
females have two X chromosomes, one inherited from each parent). About 70% of 
females with Turner’s syndrome inherit their single X from their mother; the 
remaining 30% inherit it from their father.
Skuse et al. (1997) found evidence that these two groups with Turner’s syndrome 
differ in their social behaviour. The ones who inherited their X chromosome from 
their mother had significantly more social difficulties than those who inherited their X 
chromosome from their father. This suggests that social ability is located on the 
father’s X chromosome.
All ‘normal’ girls inherit one X chromosome from their mother and another from their 
father. Whereas all ‘normal’ males have an X and a Y chromosome, but crucially 
they inherit one X chromosome and this can only be inherited from their mother. 
Therefore, Skuse et al. (1997) argue, boys are at greater risk of socially debilitating 
genetic disorders and this is perhaps why there is higher ratio of males to females who 
are diagnosed as autistic.
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1.5 Does Autism really exist?
Unlike Down’s syndrome, W illiam’s syndrome or Turner’s syndrome which are all 
diagnosed at a biological or genetic level, autism is defined at the behavioural level; to 
date there are no genetic markers, or brain structure abnormalities that have been 
identified as the cause or site of autism. There is, however, evidence of a strong 
genetic component in autism (see section 1.4).
A true syndrome must be composed of a constellation of co-existing symptoms that do 
not occur by chance. The difficulty with diagnosing at a behavioural level is that 
behaviours may come together purely by chance.
Wing and Gould (1979) undertook a comprehensive study to see if behavioural 
features of autism appear as a systematic pattern of symptoms which occur together. 
Their epidemiological study found that children with autism had deficits in i) 
socialisation, ii) communication and iii) imagination and that these problems had a 
tendency to occur together. These are the triad of impairments and are the core parts 
of the diagnostic criteria for autism in DSMIII-R (The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association).
Since autism is a developmental disorder, Wing’s triad of impairments may express 
themselves in different ways at different points along the individual’s development.
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i. Wing and Gould (1979) defined problems in socialization as an inability to 
engage in two-way interactions. They described three types of behaviour which 
capture this quality of social impairment: aloof, passive or odd. A toddler with autism 
might show aloofness by rejecting affectionate physical contact with others. The child 
might be passive by unquestioningly doing whatever s/he is told, even if it gets them 
into trouble. Walking up to a perfect stranger and showing them a series of 
photographs, as a social introduction, is an example of odd behaviour.
ii. Problems of communication might be shown in the same individual, at 
different times, too. For example, as a three year old the child may not produce any 
spoken language but as a teenager they may talk incessantly about one topic; e.g., the 
years in which certain pop songs charted.
iii. A child with autism might show an underlying impairment in imagination by 
lining up toy cars rather than pretending to drive them and involve them in crashes 
with appropriate sound effects. A teenager with autism might show no interest in 
fiction, in films, in novels or in TV dramas, preferring to read road maps or bus 
timetables.
That is why, when making a diagnosis, clinicians usually chart the individual’s 
developmental history because a ‘snapshot’ of that individual might not show 
impairments of socialization, communication and imagination.
11
1.6 A utistic C ontinuum  or Spectrum
Since autism is a developmental disorder, the clinical picture of an individual varies 
according to which stage of their development is looked at, in combination with their 
age and their intellectual ability. Wing (1988) introduced the concept of an autistic 
continuum, capturing the idea of a range of problems from highly able individuals 
who have only the slightest social impairments to those who have multiple problems 
of which social impairments are only one. The continuum overlaps with learning 
disabilities (Shea and Mesibov, 1985) and shades into normality.
1.7 Asperger’s (or Asperger) syndrome
Asperger or Asperger’s syndrome is a diagnostic label given to individuals with 
autism who are at the higher functioning end of the autistic spectmm. Asperger 
himself did not lay down specific criteria for diagnosis of his syndrome. Rather it was 
Loma Wing (1981) who first used the term Asperger’s syndrome to describe the very 
able individuals who did not fit Kanner’s description of a socially passive, aloof, 
silent person with autism. Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome are now thought to 
be a sub group of people lying along the autistic continuum.
Wing (1991) states there is a debate about whether people with Asperger’s syndrome 
are different or the same as higher-functioning individuals with autism, whether sub 
groups of autism truly exist and what theoretical use any distinction provides.
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Schopler (1985) argued that "until an empirically based distinction from higher-level 
autism can be demonstrated (p. 359)", the term Asperger’s syndrome should not be 
used. However, Wing (1991) stated that there is a lot to be said for equating high- 
functioning Kanner’s autism and Asperger’s syndrome and Happe (1994) suggested 
that the Asperger’s syndrome label has been of clinical if not theoretical value.
Studies trying to discriminate between individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and 
high-functioning autism have provided mixed results. Volkmar, Paul and Cohen 
(1985) argue that practical distinction between children with Asperger’s syndrome and 
high-functioning children with autism is problematic. Whereas Ozonoff et al.
(1991b) found that individuals with a diagnosis of higher-functioning autism 
performed poorly on Theory of Mind tasks and verbal memory compared with 
individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and so argued for a distinction between the two 
labels.
According to Wing (1991) the Asperger’s syndrome label is a signpost to service 
provision and help for families whose autistic child is of normal intelligence but 
whose condition has remained undiagnosed until adolescence or adulthood.
Additionally, the label has facilitated thinking about a clinical population for whom 
there has not been much service provision until recently and has facilitated thinking 
about autism as a disorder which persists into adulthood.
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1.8 Is Asperger’s syndrome a mild form of Autism?
Asperger’s syndrome is thought of as a mild form of autism because the 
individual has autism, but without a severe associated learning disability.
This may be misleading if ‘mild’ implies ‘less of a problem’. According to Wing 
(1991), individuals with Asperger’s syndrome are susceptible to mental illness. The 
very fact that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome shade so closely into ‘normality’ 
is often the very source of their problems and they can suffer mental illness or 
maladjustment as a consequence.
Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome may feel that they are ‘different’ from others 
and feel they just cannot comprehend, never mind engage in, the subtleties of 
relationships. Temple Grandin, an American academic with Asperger’s syndrome, 
has spoken and written about her experiences. She states in Sachs (1995) that she had 
never dated anyone, finding "such interactions completely baffling and too complex to 
deal with" because "she was never sure what was being said, or implied, or asked, or 
expected" (p. 272). Such feelings of social separation and isolation may be the 
starting point for mental illness.
Furthermore, individuals with Asperger’s syndrome have a disability that is 
essentially ‘hidden’. If someone uses a wheel chair then it is fairly obvious that they 
have a disability and probably unable to do some things. Hence, the general public 
and services providers are accommodating, tolerant and make allowances for them. 
However, if one looks ‘normal’ and mostly acts ‘normal’, then ‘unusual’ behaviours
may be completely misinterpreted and possibly be perceived as psychotic or 
threatening. An individual with Asperger’s syndrome may find their well intended 
actions entirely misinterpreted.
1.9 How common is Asperger’s syndrome?
Interestingly the ratio o f male to females increases when the higher functioning end 
(Asperger’s syndrome end) o f the autistic spectmm is looked at; the ratio ranging 
from 5:1 (Lord, Schopler and Revicki 1984) to as high as 15:1 (Newson et al., 1984). 
A number of ideas have been put forward why there is a general difference in male to 
female ratio with autism (see section 1.4) and why this difference increases when 
higher functioning populations are looked at.
Different aetiologies in autism provide a possible reason for the increase in the ratio of 
males to females as we progress towards the higher end of the autistic continuum. At 
the lower end of the continuum, autism may result from general brain injury or 
abnormality (e.g., foetal brain haemorrhaging). However, at the higher end of the 
continuum autism may be a more specific disorder resulting from the inactivation of 
the genes for social understanding.
Therefore any general brain damage resulting in autism, has a more-or-less equal 
chance to occur in boys or girls. However, a more specific genetic cause of autism, 
without a corresponding learning disability, is more likely to occur in males and that 
may be why the ratio of boys to girls increases are as we move towards the higher
15
functioning end of the autistic continuum.
1.10 Summary
Autism is currently considered a neurodevelopmental disorder with a large genetic 
component. There are many contemporary theories of autism elucidating the diverse 
range of cognitive, motor and sensory deficits which are seen across the autistic 
spectrum. The theories I detail in the next chapter not only describe autism, but seek 
to explain why such a diverse and seemingly disparate range characteristics are seen 
in this enigmatic condition.
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Chapter 2
The “Theory of Mind” hypothesis of Autism
“I do not object to people looking at their watches when I am speaking. But I strongly 
object when they start shaking them to make certain they are still going.”
(Lord William Norman Birkett)
2.1 Understanding other minds.
Imagine a world where it was possible to read other people’s thoughts as if they were 
prose from a novel. What kind o f world would it be? There would be no more 
secrets, no more lies and no more surprise birthday parties either. Would it be worth 
even talking to each other, if  we knew what people were thinking?
Of course we cannot literally read each other’s minds, but what we can do is 
sometimes infer other people’s mental states from their behaviour and from their 
informational history.
The first researchers to scientifically investigate the understanding of other minds 
were Premack and Woodruff (1978). In their seminal study, they looked to see if  a 
chimpanzee, Sarah, was sensitive to the mental state of a man in a video, struggling 
with a variety of problems. Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined the term “theory of 
mind” which they described as the ability to impute mental states to oneself and to
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others, and it was their work which sparked a whole wave of research into the 
understanding of other minds in apes, children and individuals with autism.
Theory of mind is perhaps a misleading term because it is not the same as a scientific 
theory. Rather, having a theory of mind provides the individual with the ability to 
predict mental states from external events. This ability is also known as mentalizing 
or mindreading.
The following case illustrates what happens when someone is impaired in reading 
minds.
M. is a young adult with Asperger’s syndrome who lives in residential care. He was 
in mainstream education until fourteen years old, but found it increasingly difficult to 
cope. He was diagnosed with autism at the relatively late age of sixteen and was 
given the specific label Asperger’s syndrome.
One of M.’s behaviours is to try and get carers into trouble by breaking objects and 
blaming it on the carer who is with him. Curiously, M. still destroys things while a 
second carer is in the same room and yet continues to blame it on the first carer. It is 
as if M. does not realise that seeing leads to knowing and that the second carer is an 
independent witness to the event.
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From the above example, one consequence of M.’s mindblindness is that he cannot 
effectively deceive others. His difficulties extend to not thanking people for birthday 
and Christmas presents and staring at anyone who has just hurt themselves.
On one level it looks as though M. is just an ungrateful and tactless person. However, 
if M. suffers from mindblindness then his behaviours can be interpreted very 
differently. That is he may not be able to mentalize, and therefore not realise how 
disgruntled the present giver might feel at not being thanked, or how embarrassed the 
injured person might feel when stared at.
The theory of mind hypothesis of autism explains deficits in communication, 
imagination and socialisation as an underlying cognitive problem. The theory of mind 
hypothesis of autism states that W ing’s triad of impairments (see Chapter 1.5) are 
secondary to the failure to develop a theory of mind and not primary deficits (Klin et 
al., 1992).
M.’s story is an example of mindreading in everyday life, but how do we test for 
mindblindness in a scientific and controlled way?
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2.2 The false belief paradigm.
The underlying cognitive problem with individuals with autism could be identified in 
its most specific form as a failure to grasp the substantive quality of a simple factual 
belief. But how do you test someone’s belief? One difficulty in testing beliefs is that 
beliefs and reality are usually congruent with one another. For example, if you 
believe that your car is parked outside your house and you look out of a front window, 
then you fully expect to see your car. Even when you are not looking at your car, you 
still believe that it is there.
A car thief might steal your vehicle as you watch television, but your belief remains 
that it is parked outside. In this case you have a false belief about the location of your 
car, where reality and your mental state become incongruous with one another.
2.3 Metarepresentation and understanding mental states: the role of pretence.
Imagine that a four year old picks up a banana and starts to use it like a telephone.
The child passes the banana to his/her mother and says, " It’s for you mummy ". Both 
the child and the parent are aware that in reality the banana is a fmit, but that in those 
moments it represents a telephone and there is no confusion about the banana’s 
identities.
Leslie (1991) argues for a distinction between primary representations (in the above 
example, a banana) and metarepresentations (in the above case, a telephone).
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Primary representations store literal information about the real world. Whereas, 
metarepresentations allow for the construction of hypothetical events, such as 
descriptions of thoughts, dreams and pretend objects.
Leslie (1991) argues that in the banana telephone example there is decoupled 
representation because the primary representation is copied and the normal links to the 
outside world are suspended, i.e., the banana is no longer a fruit because it has 
become a telecommunications device.
An example of a primary representation is that Mum has a banana. While a 
metarepresentation derived from this (i.e., a decoupled copy of it), might have the 
form Mum pretends (or believes) the banana to be a telephone.
Leslie (1991) postulates a computational-cognitive view of why individuals with 
autism fail to attribute mental states to others. Leslie (1991) states that in autism 
there is damage to the capacity for metarepresentation because the decoupling device 
does not function. Leslie (1991) argues that this is the fundamental reason why 
individuals with autism cannot engage in pretend play and have deficits with other 
metarepresentational concepts like beliefs, desires etc.
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2.4 The Unexpected transfer task.
At about the age of four, typically developing children show an ability to infer the 
representational states of themselves and others. Children can display this ability by 
passing a number of theory of mind tasks; e.g., a false belief task. The unexpected 
transfer task was originally devised by Wimmer and Pemer (1983). Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie and Frith (1985) used Wimmer and Pemer’s design in their ‘Sally-Anne’ 
experiment in which they tested children with autism and children with Down’s 
syndrome, as well as typically developing children.
Two dolls were used, Sally and Anne, to act out the scenario (see Figurel, p.23, by 
kind permission of Peter Mitchell. Taken from lecture notes). Sally has a box and 
Anne has a bag. Sally has a ball which she puts into her box. Sally then goes out. 
Anne then takes out Sally’s ball and puts it into her bag while Sally is away. Then 
Sally comes back and wants her ball. The test question is asked, "Where will Sally 
look for her ball?"
The correct answer is of course "the box". This answer is correct because Anne has 
taken out the ball unbeknownst to Sally (who has not seen the transfer) and Sally still 
believes that the ball is where it was last. It was argued that to answer the test 
question correctly, participants need to represent Sally’s mental state in their own 
minds by making a representation of a representation (or metarepresentation). The 
crucial point is that someone’s knowledge depends on their own informational access. 
In this example seeing leads to knowing: without having seen the transfer, in this
experiment. Sally is unlikely to know the new location of the ball. Sally could have 
been told about the new location, but that would require informational access of a 
different kind.
Figure 1.
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Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) ingenuously asked children a location-based test question, 
i.e., "Where will Sally look for her ball?". Therefore, children’s beliefs were tested 
without them having to understand any mentalistic vocabulary. For instance, the kind 
of understanding that would be required to answer a test question like, " Where do 
you believe Sally will look for her ball?".
Furthermore, Wimmer and Pemer (1983) found that children who failed the false 
belief task did not fail due to poor recollection/memory of the sequence of events in 
the unexpected transfer task. Wimmer and Pemer (1983) found a developmental trend 
showing that typically developing children between the ages of 4 and 6 years passed 
the false belief task, but younger children failed. Nevertheless, the children who 
failed to answer the test question correctly still managed to answer the memory test 
question correctly, i.e., " Where did Anne put the ball?".
In their experiment, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) discovered that the children with 
autism, who had a relatively high verbal mental age (as measure by the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale, or BPVS), performed poorly when compared to verbal age matched 
typically developing children and verbal aged matched children with Down’s 
syndrome.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) found that the vast majority of the children with autism (16 
out of 20) incorrectly judged that Sally would look for the ball in its new location (the 
bag). It was as if the children with autism did not take into account Sally’s belief
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which, although false, arose from her state of ignorance.
Baron-Cohen et a l.’s (1985) verbal mental age controls cleverly ruled out i). 
immaturity in verbal intelligence and ii). any language comprehension deficit as 
competing explanations for the autistic children’s failure. Furthermore, the inclusion 
of the Down’s syndrome control group suggests that having a learning disability per 
se can not explain failure on the task.
DeGelder (1987) criticised Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) study on different grounds. 
DeGelder (1987) stated that children with autism are known to have deficits in their 
pretend play and their imagination and that the unexpected transfer task relies too 
heavily on the children’s ability to make-believe. DeGelder (1987) argued that 
children with autism might view the dolls as inanimate and not capable of having 
beliefs etc. Therefore, the children might resort to a default test question 
interpretation and ask themselves where they themselves would look for the ball, i.e., 
the ball’s current location.
Though another experiment helped refute DeGelder’s criticism, by utilising the 
deceptive box procedure.
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2.5 The deceptive box paradigm
Pemer, Frith, Leslie and Leekam (1989) investigated autistic children’s understanding 
of their own and another person’s mental state using the deceptive box paradigm.
First devised by Pemer, Leekam and Wimmer (1987), children are presented with a 
Smarties tube and asked what they think is inside. (Smarties are small, many 
coloured, oval-shaped, well-known European confectioneries. A US equivalent is 
M&Ms. Smarties are packaged in a distinctive tube which displays its contents on the 
outside). After replying "sweets", the experimenter reveals that the box actually 
contains a pencil which is then put back in the tube. Finally children are asked to say 
what another person who had never seen the tube before would think was inside. 
Pemer et al. (1987) found that typically developing 4 year old children correctly 
judged that another person would think it contained Smarties. Younger children failed 
to acknowledge another person’s false belief and responded with the realist answer of 
pencils.
When this experiment was repeated with children with autism, Pemer et al. (1989) 
found that only 4 out of 24 correctly answered the test question.
Pemer et al.’s (1989) results confirmed and strengthened Baron-Cohen, Leslie and 
Frith’s (1985) findings. Their results supported the idea that children with autism 
have a deficient theory of mind, resulting in mindblindness and that this could not be 
attributed to problems of make-believe as DeGelder (1987) had argued.
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2.6 B ut w hat abou t the talented m inority?
There is, however, another problem with the theory of mind hypothesis of autism and 
that is a small but nevertheless significant number of children with autism regularly 
pass tests of false belief. These data seem anomalous if autism entails a lack of 
understanding that minds contain beliefs. There are three possible ways of explaining 
this finding.
i) . One extreme position is to say that the children who passed the tasks are 
wrongly diagnosed and are not in fact autistic. This seems very unlikely, but 
nevertheless is a possibility.
ii) . The diametrically opposed position is that the theory of mind hypothesis is 
incorrect because it simply cannot account for the children who pass the task and yet 
are autistic.
iii) . In between the two extremes, it could be argued that the theory of mind 
hypothesis may explain some of the cognitive impairments seen in individuals with 
autism but does not fully explain the disorder.
2.7 Second-order belief attribution
Baron-Cohen (1989) attempted to salvage the theory of mind hypothesis of autism by 
suggesting that although some children with autism could pass first- order theory of 
mind tasks (showing an ability to think about another person’s thoughts about an 
objective event), they could not pass second-order theory of mind tasks (showing an
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ability to think about another person’s thoughts about a third person’s thoughts about 
an objective event).
Baron-Cohen suggested that autism was a delay in the development of a 
metarepresentational capacity rather than a substantive deficit. He argued that the 
80% of children with autism who failed the Sally-Anne task were delayed in their 
first-order belief attribution unlike the 20% who passed.
Baron-Cohen set out to support his hypothesis by again using a paradigm first 
developed by Pemer and Wimmer (1985). The scenario was once more enacted using 
two toys, John and Mary, who lived in a toy village which contained two houses, a 
church and a park. The story consisted of four episodes:
Episode 1. Mary and John saw the ice scream van in the park.
Episode2. John went home to get some money and meantime Mary saw the ice­
cream van move to the church.
Episode3. John unexpectedly sees the ice-cream van at the church, so his belief 
about the van’s location remains true.
Episode 4. Mary sets out to look for John whom she is told, has gone for an ice­
cream.
The participants were 10 typically developing children, 10 children with Down’s 
syndrome and 10 children with autism who were all matched for verbal mental age. 
They were all asked the test question:
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" Where does Mary think John has gone to buy his ice-cream? "
The correct answer is "the park" because in the second order belief attribution task, 
participants have to make a judgement about Mary’s belief about John’s belief’s; i.e., 
judgements about one person’s false belief about another person’s tme belief.
Baron-Cohen (1989) found that 90% of the typically developing children (mean 
calendar age 7.5) passed the belief question; 60% of the children with Down’s 
syndrome (mean verbal mental age 7.5) passed the belief question and none of the 
children with autism (mean verbal mental age 12.2) passed the belief question.
From these results Baron-Cohen concluded that although some individuals with 
autism may have the means of passing a first-order theory of mind task, they could not 
pass a second-order theory of mind task and therefore did not have a fully 
representational theory of mind.
Significantly, however, Bowler (1992) showed that 73 % of young adults with 
Asperger’s syndrome were able to pass second-order belief attribution tasks, again 
using Pemer and Wimmer’s (1985) John/Mary design. Therefore, these individuals, 
who showed an autistic profile yet could pass both first- and second- order theory of 
mind tasks, posed another serious problem for the theory of mind hypothesis of 
autism.
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2.8 The Eves Task
In order to keep the theory of mind hypothesis of autism alive, Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore and Robertson (1997) developed an "Advanced test of Theory of Mind" 
which they called "Reading the Mind in the eyes task" or "Eyes Task" for short. They 
argued that first- and second-order theory of mind tasks produce ceiling effects when 
the child has a mental age of between 6 and 7 and therefore such tasks were 
inappropriate for testing theory of mind in adults with Asperger’s syndrome.
This time the experimenters moved away from tasks involving belief attribution. 
Instead, Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) showed participants photographs of the eye region 
of people’s faces (from midway along the nose to just above the eyebrow). Before the 
main study, Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) asked normal adult judges to generate words to 
describe the mental states of the people in the photographs just from their eyes. The 
experimenters found that blind raters unanimously agreed with one another about the 
words selected by the judges. Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) then asked an adult group 
with high-functioning autism and Asperger’s syndrome, an adult group with 
Tourettes’s syndrome and a normal adult group if they could infer the mental states of 
the people from their eye region photographs.
Baron-Cohen and Jolliffe (1997) found that the autistic group were significantly 
impaired on the eyes task when compared with the control groups. Note that the 
adults with autism did not fail the task, but performed significantly less well in 
comparison to the control groups.
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In the control Emotion Task, all the participants had to judge photographs of whole 
faces displaying basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, afraid, disgusted, and surprised). 
They performed at ceiling and so the experimenters ruled out any deficits in basic 
emotional expression understanding, as an explanation for deficits on the Eyes Task.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) argue that the Eyes task provides a pure test of theory of 
mind (requiring no executive function (see sections 2.10 and 2.11) component and no 
central coherence component (see section 2.13a). Consequently, Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1997) have moved the theory of mind hypothesis of autism a long way from the 
conceptual neatness that autism, on a cognitive level, amounts to a failure on theory of 
mind tasks. Hence, in trying to equate the Eyes Task to Theory of Mind tasks, Baron- 
Cohen et al. (1997) risk moving away from the precision offered by tasks like Sally- 
Anne.
2.9 How else could y o u  pass a theory of mind task?
Frith, Happe and Siddons (1994) suggested that autistic passers of both first- and 
second-order theory of mind tasks may have used non-theory of mind and non- 
mentalistic methods to solve the tasks; e.g. "hacking". By hacking, I understand Frith 
et al. (1994) to mean a logical method of processing the stories and coming out with 
the correct answer. Supposedly, the autistic passers do not infer the mental states of 
the protagonists in a false belief story. Instead they use this method of hacking to 
achieve the correct answer.
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However, Pemer and his colleagues’ paradigms were well conceived and controlled, 
and in their view passing tasks could only be done if someone could understand 
mental states. Therefore, there is no reason to think that a correct answer can be 
hacked out. If it were true that someone could hack out a correct answer, then passing 
or failing a false belief task would not necessarily tell us anything about the 
mentalizing ability of the individual. Therefore purporting that a test of false belief 
would not be a good operationalization of a representation of theory of mind. In 
consequence, failing to acknowledge false belief would not be informative about the 
status of an individual’s theory of mind.
Hence, the core phenomenon supporting the theory of mind hypothesis of autism 
would be undermined; failing to acknowledge false belief would not necessarily imply 
lack of theory of mind, given that a test of false belief would have dubious credentials 
as an operationalization of theory of mind.
2.10 Executive dysfunction hypothesis of autism
There are other symptoms of autism which are not so easily explained by the theory of 
mind account. For example, consider the autistic individual’s need for sameness, their 
difficulty in switching attention, a tendency to perseverate and a lack of impulse 
control. These symptoms are similar to those shown by individuals with frontal lobe 
lesions in executive dysfunction syndrome.
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Denkla (1996a) lists four elements of executive function: initiating, sustaining, 
shifting and inhibition/stopping. Denkla (1996b) suggests that executive function may 
be considered as metacognitive, but that it ought to remain close to its clinical 
neurology roots of motor praxis or ‘execution’ in for example motor sequencing tasks 
(Denkla, 1996b). Ozonoff et al. (1991a) provide a more extensive definition:
"Executive function is defined as the ability to maintain an appropriate problem­
solving set for attainment of a future goal; it includes behaviors such as planning, 
impulse control, inhibition of prepotent but irrelevant responses, set maintenance, 
organized search, and flexibility of thought and action." (p. 1083).
2.11 Neuropsychological tests of Executive function
There are a number of tests of executive function and The Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test is a widely used measure that assesses an aspect of inhibitory control (Baddeley,
1990). In this task, four cards are placed in front of the participant. They vary across 
three dimensions: colour, geometrical shape and number (e.g., a card may have two 
blue stars). The participants are asked to match a deck of similar cards to the target 
cards, but are not informed explicitly of the rules for sorting. Feedback regarding 
each attempted match is given. The initial unstated sorting rule is by colour and after 
ten consecutive correct responses the rule is changed, but without informing the 
participant.
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For accurate performance a recently learned response rule, has to be inhibited. 
Individuals with autism show similarities with those who have frontal lobe damage 
because they tend to persevere sorting the cards using the previous rule, even when 
told their responses are incorrect.
Ozonoff et al. (1991a) gave individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and High- 
functioning autism several tests of emotion perception, theory of mind and executive 
function (including the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test). They found that in much the 
same way as individuals with frontal lobe damage, the high functioning autistic 
participants showed selective deficits in executive function.
The experimenters also found that the tests of executive function more accurately 
detected autism than either the emotion perception or the theory of mind tests.
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2.12 H ow  m ight executive function deficits be related to deficit in theory o f
mind? The Windows Task
Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe and Tidswell (1991) devised the ‘windows task’ in which 
participants were presented with two boxes. One contained a chocolate treat and the 
other was empty, but in order to win the treat, participants had to point to the empty 
box. Russell et al. (1991) found that children with autism and typically developing 3 
year olds behaved in much the same way, i.e. they seemed unable to resist pointing to 
the box that contained the treat, so the other player won the treat by default. In 
contrast, typically developing 4 and 5 year olds were able to resist the urge to respond 
impulsively and so were able to point to the empty box and win the chocolate.
The windows task cleverly links executive function with theory of mind based tasks 
because the participants must i). curb the impulse (executive control) to point directly 
at what they want and ii). be deceptive because the other player acts on the 
participant’s gesture (if the other player does not find the chocolate, it remains in the 
other location for the participant to collect)
Russell et al. (1991) argue children with autism fail the unexpected transfer task not 
because that they fail to take into account Sally’s mental state, but rather they act 
impulsively about the location of the ball.
35
2.13 Other theories of autism
2.13a Central Coherence Theory
Mottron, Burack, Strauder and Robaey (1999) state that in addition to Wing’s triad of 
impairments of socialisation, communication and imagination, there are other 
"nontriadic" signs. That is, there are other characteristics of autism including tasks 
which individuals with autism are better at than typically developing people.
Frith and Shah (1983) found that children with autism scored above average on the 
Children’s Embedded Figures Test, for their own mental age, and were better than 
chronologically and mental age matched typically developing children. In this test, 
participants were asked to locate a small target shape in a drawing of a larger 
everyday shape made up of confusing lines (e.g., finding a triangle shape in a picture 
of a pram). When looking at the figures it seems as if the larger shapes created by the 
criss-crossing lines are so compelling that the small embedded shape is simply not 
seen.
Frith and Shah (1993) also found that participants with autism were faster at 
reproducing 40 different block designs than learning disabled and normal controls. 
The Block Design is a subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales and the participant 
is asked to assemble an identical image of a 2-D picture, as fast as possible, using 
painted cubic (3-D) blocks of red and white.
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The key features of both the Embedded figures test and the Block Design Test is that a 
large geometrical shape has to be broken down or segmented into smaller shapes.
Frith (1989) argues that individuals with autism show better performance on these 
task because the have a cognitive style allowing them to attend to local rather global 
details, i.e., they have weak central coherence.
Another source of evidence for this theory comes from idiosyncratic peaks in 
visuospatial and perceptual functioning, e.g. Happe (1996) found that participants 
with autism were less likely to succumb to two-dimensional visual illusions than were 
other groups. Happe (1996) argued that geometrical (e.g. muller-lyer) visual illusions 
‘work’ because people typically see the entire picture as a global whole and that 
individuals with autism are better at processing local rather than global information 
and therefore they are less likely to ‘fall’ for those type of illusions.
However, there is a growing body of counter evidence for the above semantic deficit 
hypothesis. Brian and Bryson (1996) found that there was no significant difference 
in response times or accuracy between high function individuals with autism and 
developmentally matched controls in reaction times to meaningful (e.g., birthday 
cake), abstract and fragmented disembedded stimuli. Brian and Bryson (1996) also 
found that both the autistic and normal groups had more difficulty (as shown by 
slower reaction times) in finding a simple shape in a meaningful rather than non- 
meaningful drawing. Brian and Bryson (1996) argue that Shah and Frith’s (1983,
1993) findings may have been due to developmental differences rather than
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differences in cognitive styles between the normal and autistic populations.
Furthermore, Ropar and Mitchell (in press) discovered, in contrast to Happe (1996), 
that participants with autism were just as susceptible to two-dimensional visual 
illusions as controls. Ropar and Mitchell (in press) presented a variety of visual 
illusions to individuals with autism on a computer screen, and asked them to use 
computer keys to adjust stimuli to match target shapes. The experimenters concluded 
that individuals with autism were susceptible to visual illusions because when 
adjusting lines or circles, the participants systematically underestimated the stimuli’s 
size in comparison to the control condition.
2.13b Socio-Affective theory
Hobson (1990) argues that individuals with autism have specific impairments in 
understanding others as people with their own feelings. The theory of mind 
hypothesis of autism posits that the ability to understand other’s emotions is 
secondary to a failure to develop a theory of mind. In contrast, Hobson’s (1990) 
argument revolves back to Kanner’s original clinical observation by postulating that 
the ability to form emotional contact with people is innate and it is this incapacity in 
individuals with autism which is the source of their social debilitation. Hobson (1990) 
states that there are specific forms of communication between a young child and adult 
which provide the necessary psychological basis for understanding minds. Brown,
Lee and Hobson (1997) state that these forms of communication involve 1). patterned 
intercoordination of feeling between the child and others, 2). an ability to see or
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otherwise apprehend the directedness of other people’s attitudes towards a shared 
world, and 3). a propensity to identify with these outwardly focused attitudes of 
others, and to recognise the distinction between others’ attitudes and one’s own.
2.14d Summary
In conclusion, the theory of mind hypothesis of autism and the executive dysfunction 
account of autism are not the only theories which try to explain the disorder. (Nor are 
the two theories necessarily competing against each other; i.e., Pemer (1997) and 
Russell (1996) have both suggested that theory of mind and executive function are 
linked).
Each and every theory about autism seems to be able to explain certain aspects of the 
disorder, but as yet there is no fully integrated account which manages to both 
describe and explain all the different characteristics of the disorder; tracing it from 
infancy through to adulthood and encompassing both individuals with severe learning 
disabilities and those who are higher functioning.
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Chapter 3
How can we help individuals with Autism acquire interpersonal
understanding?
" Education is an admirable thing, but it is as well to remember from time to time that 
nothing that is worth knowing can be taught
(Oscar Wilde)
3.1 What help is available for individuals with Asperger’s syndrome?
With all the cumulative knowledge present in the literature about autism and 
especially its associated cognitive impairments, can anything be done to help in a 
practical way?
In a review of treatments for autism, Howlin (1998) states that there is a paucity of 
service provision for individuals with Asperger’s syndrome because their needs are 
poorly understood. Howlin (1998) argues that because of their uneven profile of skills 
and deficits, these individuals may need even more specialised help than those with 
more global learning disabilities.
As stated previously, individuals with Asperger’s syndrome have relatively high 
cognitive ability, yet show real problems in understanding the subtleties of social
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interaction and display mindblindness in their everyday lives.
It would, therefore, be invaluable if there was a way of making these individuals 
understand how other people think or feel, or why people respond in the way they do. 
For example, perhaps M. (see chapter 2.1) could learn that laughing at someone who 
injures themselves is considered a socially unacceptable thing to do. Is there is way of 
making these individuals into mindreaders?
3.2 Can rules for understanding the mental states for others be taught?
For the same reason that the diagnostic criteria of autism cannot be separated from 
theory, the approach selected for any intervention depends upon the theoretical 
viewpoint. Consequently, if W ing’s triad of impairments arises from a theory of mind 
deficit then it follows that if individuals with autism could be provided with a means 
to understand others’ mental states; e.g., via a set of mles, then this would be very 
beneficial to them. If the intervention succeeded, it would also provide evidence to 
support the theory of mind hypothesis of autism.
Swettenham (1995) and Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin and Hill (1996, 1997) tried to 
teach rules to children with autism, for working out the underlying mental states of 
others. Hadwin et al. (1996) specifically set out to answer the question,
" Can we teach children with autism to understand emotions, belief, or pretence? "
To do this Hadwin et al. (1996, 1997) assigned thirty autistic children to one of three 
equal-sized groups: a belief group, an emotion group and a pretence group. The
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experimenters pretested the children and categorised them into one of five levels. 
Level 1 was the simplest level of understanding and Level 5 the most complex. 
Assessment of belief and emotion understanding started at Level 1 and progressed to 
Level 5. The assessment stopped when children failed two consecutive levels. At 
each level, children had to demonstrate an understanding of the concept being tested 
by passing four tasks in succession.
To assess pretence, children were observed at play and their activities were also 
categorized into one of 5 levels, which reflected both the quality and quantity of the 
children’s play. The children were video recorded for 10 minutes playing with a set 
of toys and this recording was coded to establish the initial level of pretence.
Once the child’s level of belief/emotion/pretence had been established, the 
experimenters then proceeded to train/teach the children with a view to helping them 
to reach higher levels.
The next page shows the teaching method for level 5, the highest level in the belief 
group.
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L e v e l s .  False Belief
Example. Unexpected transfer.
Let’s play a game with Claire.
Look Claire has a penny.
Here are two purses, a black purse and a red purse.
Claire puts her penny into the black purse.
Claire is going out to play now.
Claire has gone out. She can’t see what we are doing.
Shall we play a trick on Claire? We’ll take the penny out of the black purse and put it 
in the red purse!
Here comes Claire back from the playground.
Belief Question. Where does Claire think the penny is?
justification Question. Why does Claire think it is in the [black/red] purse?
Check question. Where did Claire put the penny?
Teaching
Belief Question. For an incorrect response.
Remember, Claire didn’t see us hide the penny in the red purse, so Claire doesn’t know 
there is a penny in the red purse. She won’t think it is in there.
Claire will think the penny is in the black purse, because she put the penny in the black 
purse.
Then teach the general principle:
If people don’t know that things have changed then they will think things are just the same.
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Hadwin et al. (1996) found that it was possible to teach the children to pass emotion 
and belief tasks, and once taught simple tasks they were able to move on to more 
complex tasks. Additionally, the children passed similar tasks on two month follow 
up. However, the children in the pretence group showed no significant improvement 
in their production of spontaneous pretend play.
Furthermore, the children from all three groups did not generalise their taught 
understanding of mental states in one area, to understanding mental states in untaught 
areas. For example, children in the emotion group did not show improvements in 
their understanding of beliefs or in their production of play.
3.3 Does teaching rules work?
Hadwin’s approach is questionable because solely teaching someone rules to pass 
tests may be considered a very crude procedure:
1. The rules may be learned and applied, but without understanding. The 
experimenters’ own impressions were that the children "may have learned to pass the 
tasks rather than understanding the concepts underlying the rules" (Hadwin et al.,
1996, p.359).
2. Learning rules does not necessarily mean that the children will understand and 
apply what they have been taught in the context of real life situations. Hence the 
teaching might serve no practical purpose.
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In a related study, Hadwin et al. (1997) asked the question "Does teaching theory of 
mind have an effect on the ability to develop conversation in children with autism?". 
Hadwin et al. (1997) studied language acquisition and theory of mind. More 
specifically the experimenters wanted to see if their method of teaching children with 
autism, to pass tasks that assess understand of mental states, had any ameliorating 
effect on parallel understanding; in this case the children’s conversational ability.
Hadwin et al. (1997) looked at two aspects of autistic children’s communicative 
ability. Firstly, their ability to develop and expand on conversation. Secondly the 
children’s frequency of use of mental state terms (e.g., think, believe etc.) in their 
speech.
The experimenters assessed the children before and after teaching. To assess 
conversational skills the children were encouraged to read a story from a picture book 
with their caregiver (usually their mother). There were no written words in the stories 
just illustrations. Caregivers were asked to prompt children to encourage them to tell 
the stories; e.g., "What are they doing?" The story telling sessions were video- 
recorded and transcribed, firstly, according to conversation ability, based on the 
coding scheme used by Tager-Flusberg and Anderson (1991) and, secondly, by 
counting the number of mental or internal state terms used by the children.
The experimenters found that the teaching of mental state terms to children with 
autism had little effect on either of the measured aspects of conversation.
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3.4 Theory of mind in everyday life
Even if someone with autism passes theory of mind tasks, does that mean they then 
are socially able? According the Frith, Happe and Siddons (1994) the answer is ‘not 
necessarily’. They found that although some children with autism could pass first and 
second order theory of mind tasks, they still lacked interpersonal understanding, as 
rated by carers using The Vineland Adaptive Behavioural Scales (VABS) and Frith et 
al.’s (1994) additionally devised items for the VABS. The majority of participants 
with autism demonstrated "mind-blindness" in the laboratory as well as in everyday 
life. Then there were those individuals, according to Frith et al. (1994), who learned 
strategies to pass the theory of mind tests, but still showed no evidence of mentalizing 
in everyday life. Finally there was a third sub-group of autistic individuals who were 
able to represent mental states in the lab and in real life: Happe’s talented minority.
Frith et al. (1994) screened the expanded and survey forms of the VABS for items 
which appeared to rely upon the understanding of mental states. Seventy items were 
compiled and were given to undergraduate students with instructions to categorise 
items into two sets: items which required the attribution of independent states (a 
theory of mind) and items which did not. Items which received an inter-rater 
agreement of greater than 75% were then narrowed down still further to 2 sets (active 
and interactive sociability) of 16, by five experts in the area of theory of mind (Frith et 
al, 1994).
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Frith et al. (1994) called the sets Active sociability and Interactive sociability.
Active sociability items refer to behaviours which could be performed without the 
ability to mentalize and interactive sociability items which refer to behaviours which 
could not be performed without this ability.
3.5 The Bubble Dialogue computer program
Hadwin et al’s (1996, 1997) studies succeeded in teaching children with autism rules 
for understanding beliefs and emotions, but did not succeed in increasing the 
children’s quality and quantity of pretend play and nor did the children generalise 
their learning to untaught areas.
Frith et al. (1994) looked at theory of mind in everyday life and found that even some 
passers of second order theory of mind tasks did not show mentalizing outside the 
laboratory.
So is there another way of improving the interpersonal understanding of individuals 
with autism, that does not rely upon rule-based teaching?
Frith (1989) wrote that " In order to develop a theory of mind one needs not only the 
ability to mentalize, but also experience. One needs experience with people who have 
different relationships to each other, and different personal interests. " (p.166).
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If we could somehow create the experience of role taking, simulate the experience of 
seeing mentalistic processes in action, then perhaps this could facilitate the 
understanding of others’ minds.
To meet that ideal, this study used a computer program, Bubble Dialogue (Gray, 
Creighton, McMahon & Cunningham, 1991), to i) improve the interpersonal 
understanding in high functioning adults with Asperger’s syndrome and ii) try and 
gain further insight into the nature of autistic cognition and deficient theory of mind.
3.6 How does Bubble dialogue work?
Bubble Dialogue is a hyper-card application which runs on the Apple Macintosh 
system. It creates an interactive comic-strip world made of "stacks" generated by the 
computer and displayed on screen. A stack is rather like a compressed book which 
has its pages stacked one on top of the other. Because the pages are displayed on a 
computer screen, only one can be seen at a time. The best way to illustrate Bubble 
Dialogue is by example (see Figure 2, p. 49).
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K r t -sp .!.._.r.ea.l]y_...Jjke...... ........ ............ ...M acDonald 's , but th e ...... ....
q ueues are so long..............
Jane Paul
1 off
Figure2.
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On the opening page, the users are introduced to a particular scenario through a 
"prologue". Clicking on the "hand" icon moves the program onto the next screen to 
begin the dialogue.
Each program user adopts the role of one of two on-screen characters. The users have 
the opportunity, by clicking on icons, to insert text into a speech bubble above the 
head of their character and then to insert text into a thought bubble which replaces the 
speech bubble once that is complete. The dialogue thus alternates between the users 
and each has access to the speech and thoughts generated by the other; i.e., where 
each user has access to what the other user publicly says and privately thinks.
There are two modes in Bubble Dialogue: a creation mode and a review mode. In 
creation mode, users can only move forward to the next speech or thought bubble. In 
review mode users can move backwards or forwards and make changes to what they 
wrote previously. Review mode was designed so that users could be reflective.
Bubble Dialogue allows the users to reflect on speech as dialogue and also alerts them 
to thought content as something distinct from speech. The program regulates turn- 
taking and serves as an interface between the two users. In this way the Bubble 
Dialogue might allow the meeting of minds to occur in an explicit process.
The program developers describe Bubble Dialogue as:
"...a computer-based technique which combines elements of role play, comic 
strip creation and reflexive dialogue analysis. Users play out the parts of characters
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on the screen, creating dialogue in the characters’ private domain (their thoughts or 
"inner speech") as well as in the public domain." (Gray, Creighton, McMahon & 
Cunningham, 1991, p.3).
However, O ’Neill and McMahon (1991) realised how the Bubble Dialogue 
application differed from full role-play: for it offered an opportunity for users to 
"project themselves onto other characters on the screen, rather than into roles. People 
normally reluctant to step into roles in front of others might easily be drawn into 
exploring roles on the screen" (p.30).
Swettenham (1996) used information technology to teach theory of mind to children 
with autism and suggested three reasons why computers would be attractive to 
children with autism. Firstly, the computer provides social and emotional distancing 
by acting as interface. Secondly, the computer intrinsically accommodates the autistic 
need for sameness. Thirdly, it allows the individual to take active control and work at 
his/her own tempo.
In Contrast to Swettenham’s (1996) study, the Bubble Dialogue program does not 
teach any rules explicitly, rather it allows the participants to literally mindread and it 
is this experience of role-play which might acquaint participants with aspects of 
thought that individuals without autism are easily able to infer. By making thoughts 
visibly concrete, rather than leaving them as hypotheticals that have to be inferred,
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thought underlies speech. This ability may then filter into their everyday lives and 
make them better mindreaders.
The potential value of Bubble Dialogue, is hinted at by the results of a study 
conducted by Hurlbert, Happe and Frith (1994). They found that people with 
Asperger’s syndrome tended to report their inner thoughts in images and so computer 
graphics may be more in tune with their iconic cognitive style. Furthermore, Parsons 
and Mitchell (1999) found that children with autism were capable of understanding 
thought bubbles as representational devices.
Moreover, Howlin (1998) states that other computer programs designed for children 
with autism have been successful when they have induced turn taking and structured 
reciprocal interaction. A visual medium and reciprocity are both integral to Bubble 
Dialogue.
3.7 "Putting yourself in someone else’s shoes" : Simulation
Harris (1991) theorizes that mental simulation is the key to understanding another 
person’s mental states. Harris (1991) argues that this process requires the capacity to 
engage in two successive steps: 1). the imagination of a particular desire or belief and 
2). the imagination of the actions, thoughts or emotions that would ensue if one were 
to have those desires or beliefs.
52
Harris (1991) argues that in childhood individuals start to understand other people’s 
mental states by this process of simulation which allows the individual to make 
predictions about others’ reactions, behaviours and internal states.
Bubble Dialogue not only allows the process of mental simulation to be structured and 
experienced through computer role play, but also to be replayed, reviewed and revised 
on screen. Bubble Dialogue inherently creates the framework for simulation, although 
what characters say and think still requires their users’ imaginative contribution.
3.8 Previous experimental work with Bubble Dialogue
The Bubble Dialogue technology has been used by Jones and colleagues to explore 
self expression and communication in children (Jones & Selby 1997) and to support 
learning in children with emotional and behavioural difficulties (EDB) (Jones, 1996), 
and explore their responses to interpersonal conflict in mainstream and EBD schools 
(Jones, Price and Selby, 1998). The formal definition of emotional and behavioural 
difficulties in the U.K. refers to "children who...(present)...inappropriate, aggressive, 
bizarre or withdrawn behaviour", and who have, " developed a range of strategies for 
dealing with day-to-day experiences that are inappropriate and impede normal 
personal and social development and make it difficult for them to learn" (Jones et al„ 
1998, p.67).
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Jones and Selby (1997) state that Bubble Dialogue can help children communicate 
and express their feelings and views when they find it difficult to communicate more 
directly. They also state that the role playing element of Bubble Dialogue provides an 
emotional "distance" which allows specific issues in the child’s life to be raised 
without direct reference. Hence, the children can play characters without having to 
identify too closely with them.
Bubble Dialogue has proven helpful in facilitating communication in children with 
EDB who find communication problematic and are often difficult to engage. It seems 
appropriate to use the technology with individuals with autism because autism is a 
disorder of communication and individuals with autism and EBD share many 
additional similarities. Rock, Fessler and Church (1997) list six specific critical 
deficits in individuals with emotional and behavioural difficulties: Cognitive 
processing, Executive functioning, Language functioning, Behavioural functioning, 
Social/Emotional functioning and Academic performance (often poor due to a 
disrupted schooling history).
Rock et al. (1997) also list Environmental Variables (e.g, quality of social support) 
and Biophysical Variables (e.g., additional learning disabilities such as dyslexia) as 
factors which can affect the outcome of someone with EBD.
Therefore, because of the similarities between the autistic and EBD populations, it 
would seem valuable to compare the dialogues produced by individuals with EBD
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with those produced by individuals with Asperger’s syndrome.
3.9 How do we know if the experience of Bubble Dialogue effected anv change 
in the mentalizing ability of individuals with Asperger’s syndrome?
To measure the real life efficacy of the Bubble Dialogue experience, I needed to 
employ a test which measured mentalizing in everyday life. For this purpose, I 
selected Frith et al’s (1994) supplementary items devised for the Vineland Adaptive 
Behavioural Scales (VABS).
I also needed tests which would allow me argue that any change in the VABS could 
only be from the experience of Bubble Dialogue and not for any other reason, e.g., 
maturation resulting in increased global cognitive functioning of the individual.
3.9a Control tests
If the Bubble Dialogue experience induced a general change in functioning, then we 
would find improvements in scores on the supplementary VABS items, British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WSCT) between pretest 
and postest. However, if the BD experience induced a change that was specific to 
social functioning, as hypothesized, then we would find a change in VABS but not in 
BPVS or WSCT.
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I opted for two tests which measure very different aspects of cognitive function 
because converging and corroborative evidence from both tests would more 
powerfully suggest that Bubble Dialogue was affecting the mentalizing ability of the 
participants with Asperger’s syndrome.
3.10 How could we obtain a more detailed definition of the adjective ‘autistic’?
To answer this question, I asked blind raters to rate the character’s speech and 
thoughts produced by the individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and the individuals 
with EBD, relative to the speech and thoughts of the characters I played.
I selected three dimensions which I envisaged would best elicit the polarities of 
Autism and EBD.
1. Emotionally charged -  emotionally flat: I selected this dimension to access the 
lack of affect which Hobson (1990) proposes in his socio-affective account of 
autism.
2. Polite -  coarse: I selected this dimension because the participants with Asperger’s 
syndrome live in residential care homes and attend mainstream colleges of Further 
Education. Whereas the participants with EBD attend a residential school almost 
exclusively for adolescents who had been excluded from mainstream state 
education because of antisocial and/or criminal disorderly conduct. Hence I
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expected the characters played by the individuals with Asperger’s syndrome to be 
more polite than the characters played by the individuals with EBD.
3. Pursuing a topic too little -  pursuing a topic too much: I chose this dimension to 
educe ratings reflecting the autistic tendency for perseveration.
I anticipated that the individuals with Asperger’s syndrome would be rated as 
emotionally flat, polite and pursuing a topic too much. I expected to see the reverse 
for the individuals with EBD.
Additionally, with increased experience of Bubble Dialogue I expected the 
participants with Asperger’s syndrome to show improvements, with time, along the 
three rated dimensions.
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Chapter 4
Method
4.1 Participants
Four participants were recruited by myself after I approached two residential care 
homes and one residential school, within the West Midlands region. Before starting 
the pre-testing and Bubble Dialogue sessions, I visited the homes and school so that I 
could get to know the participants, their carers and their teachers and they could get to 
know me.
i. Participants with Autism
D. and N. both have a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome. They live in different 
residential care homes in the West Midlands. Both men attend local colleges and their 
long-term goal is to live independently.
D.’s main interest is science and he frequently borrows books from his local library 
about evolution, physics, astronomy and chemistry. As well as science fact, D. is 
interested in science fiction and has fifty comics of that genre. D. can be very quiet, 
but becomes enquiring and verbose when he talks about science. D. attends three 
local colleges where he studies pottery, photography, biology and information 
technology. D. would like to have a career in the science industry.
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One of N .’s main interests is the German language. Initially N. was self taught, 
though with tuition he passed GSCE German. N. has visited Germany and he often 
reads his German dictionary. N .’s parents have a satellite dish and he watches 
German television programmes whenever he visits them at weekends. N. also plays 
personal computer games and console-based games. N. attends a local college and 
studies, amongst other things, information technology. Additionally, N. works once a 
week at the local branch of the National Autistic Society.
At the start of testing,
D. was 23 years and 4 months and 
N. was 23 years and 2 months.
ii. Participants with Emotional and Behavioural Difficulties
P. and W. have Emotional and Behavioural Difficulties and both young men live and 
attend the same residential school for children with EDB in the West Midlands. I
I was told by P.’s teacher that he had a slight hearing problem, but he did not seem at 
all impeded in either his hearing or speech production. P. was very talkative and 
regaled me with anecdotes, including one about how he and his friends "Jacked a 
Volvo" parked in the hospital situated behind their school. P. also asked me how 
expensive the Apple classic computer was and how much he could "flog one for".
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W. was also very chatty. He asked me if I smoked and on one occasion 
told me not to tell his teacher that he had some cigarettes and a lighter in his pocket. 
He told me a story about how a friend of his was so desperate for a cigarette that he 
"rolled up" some tea leaves and smoked them instead.
At the start of testing,
P. was 14 years and 9 months and 
W. was 14 years and 10 months.
60
4.2 Apparatus
The principal piece of hardware was an Apple Mackintosh Classic computer installed 
with Bubble Dialogue (Gray, Creighton, McMahon and Cunningham, 1991) and 
HyperCard program. Figure 3, below, is the beginning of the scenario ‘Jane and Paul’, 
for Bubble Dialogue session number 1.
Fisure 3
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4 3  M easures and P rocedure
All three of the following tests were administered both before and after the six Bubble 
Dialogue sessions.
The care assistants/support workers who knew D. and N. the best were interviewed 
using the Vineland Adaptive Behavioural Scales (VABS) supplementary items (Frith 
et al., 1994).
D. and N. were tested with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Grant and 
Berg, 1948).
Additionally, D. and N. were tested with the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 
which provides an assessment of verbal comprehension (Dunn et al, 1982).
N.B. D„ N. and their carers received no debriefing about the tests after the first 
administration.
P. and W. were not tested and participated in the Bubble Dialogue sessions only.
Ideally both D. and N. and their carers would have been tested and interviewed on the 
same dates. However, this was not possible because of limited access to D. and N. 
and their keyworkers were not always on shift when I tested D. and N.
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The Bubble Dialogue sessions with D. and N. took about one hour with the frequency 
of approximately 1 per week for 6 weeks.
Table 1 below shows the dates when D. was tested.
Test
(D.)
Date of pre-test Date of post-test
Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST)
11/3/98 27/5/98
British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS)
11/3/98 27/5/98
Vineland Adaptive 
Behavioural Scales 
(VABS)
29/3/98 27/5/98
Table 2 below show the dates when N. was tested.
Test
m
Date of pre-test Date of post-test
Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST)
22/3/98 3/6/98
British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS)
1/4/98 10/6/98
Vineland Adaptive 
Behavioural Scales 
(VABS)
22/3/98 10/6/98
Table 3 below shows the dates when D. and N. experienced the Bubble Dialogue 
sessions. ______  _______
Parti ci nant Dale of 
Scenario 1 
Session 1
Date of 
Scenario 2 
Session 2
Date of 
Scenario 3 
Session 3
Dale of 
Scenario 4 
Session 4
Date of 
Scenario 5 
Session 5
Date of 
Scenario 6 
Session 6
D. 29/3/98 31/3/98 3/4/98 6/4/98 19/5/98* 19/5/98*
N. 1/4/98 8/4/98 22/4/98 29/4/98 13/5/98 27/5/98
* see chapter 5.3a p. 102.
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4.4 Test administration
4.4a Vineland Adaptive Behavioural scales supplementary items 
(Frith et al.. 1994)
The VABS is not a test given directly to the individuals. Rather it takes the form of a 
semi-structured interview with a third party, i.e., with someone who knows the 
individual well.
I said to the respondent that,
1. there are no right or wrong answers,
2. people perform different activities at different ages and stages in their life
3. and the focus is not on what the individual can do but on what he does. The 
prime emphasis was on whether or not a given activity is usually or habitually 
performed, whether is it sometimes or partially performed, or not at all? I
I encouraged the respondent to feel free to ask questions at any point during the 
interview.
In accordance with the general guidelines of administering the scale I,
1. Never read and never permitted the respondent to read any of the items,
2. and conducted the interview for at least 5 minutes before scoring any items (to 
establish rapport).
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Scoring Procedures with the VABS
Score 2 - Activity is usually/habitually performed
Score 1 - Performed sometimes or with partial success
Score 0 - is never performed, has not had the opportunity to perform the activity,
or if the respondent has no knowledge of the individual’s performance.
Below is the entire list of Frith et a l’s (1994) supplementary items for the VABS. 
There are 32 items in total. Sixteen items make up the active sociability section and 
16 items make up the interactive sociability section.
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(Behaviours probably not requiring a theory of mind)
Shows a desire to please 
Takes turns in conversation
Shares toys when asked (shares/lends possessions i f  asked)
Recognises happiness and sadness in others
Initiates social contacts (socially active or passive)
Initiates fixed small talk
Uses appropriate table manners
Delivers a simple message
Says please when asking for something
Names favourite TV programmes and times
Ask permission to play with a toy (asks permission to use other’s things) 
Plays board games
Follows time limits set by care-giver 
Responds appropriately when introduced 
Apologises for errors 
Returns borrowed items
Active Sociability
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(Behaviours probably requiring a theory of mind)
Chooses appropriate presents
Responds to hints and indirect cues in conversation
Makes confidences
Recognises surprise and embarrassment in others 
Initiates conversation of interest to others 
Initiates flexible small talk 
Supplies important missing information 
Expresses ideas in more than one way 
Refrains from statements that might embarrass 
Engages in elaborate make-believe activities 
Knows behaviour appropriate for different people
Plays hide and seek or cheat appropriately (plays strategic games requiring bluff
or deception, e.g., poker)
Has realistic long-range goals and plans 
Keeps secrets for as long as is appropriate 
Apologises for hurting other’s feelings 
Weighs consequences of actions
Items 3 andl l (active sociability) and item 12 (interactive sociability) were 
inappropriate to ask about adults so I contacted Happe who suggested the changes in 
italics.
Interactive Sociability
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4.4b The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
The procedure for administering the WCST followed the instructions provided in the 
WCST accompanying manual (Heaton, 1981).
Administration
I read out the administration instructions verbatim and followed the administration 
procedure.
" This test is a little unusual, because I am not allowed to tell you very much about 
how to do it. You will be asked to match each of the cards in these decks to one of 
the four key cards.3 You must always take the top card from the deck,b and place it 
below the key card you think it matches. c I can’t tell you how to match the cards, but 
I will tell you each time whether you are right or wrong. If you are wrong leave the 
card where you’ve placed it, and try to get the next card correct. Use this deck,d and 
then continue with the second deck. There is no time on this test."
a. Lay out the stimulus cards across the table from the participant, in the standard 
order, with the first card at the participant’s left side.
b. Throughout the test, the stimulus cards and the cards in the decks should be 
kept in order. Never shuffle the cards or allow the participant to do so. As they face 
the participant, the figures on the cards should have the following configurations 
(triangles have the bases facing down, and stars have two points facing down): cards
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with only one figure have it in the centre; cards with two figures have one in the upper 
left and one in the lower right; when there are three figures they are in the 
configuration of an equilateral triangle, with two figures on either side of the top and 
the third centred at the bottom of the card; when there are four figures they are in the 
configuration of a square, with one figure at each comer of the card.
c. Point to the four stimulus cards.
d. Examiner hands the first deck to the participant, and places the second deck to 
the side.
(Heaton, 1981)
Procedure
I began by responding ‘right’ each time the participant matched to colour, and 
'wrong’ each time he did not match to colour. This continued until the participant 
completed 10 consecutive colour responses. I then, without comment, changed to 
form (shape) as the correct response.
Form remained the correct sorting principle until the participant had again completed 
10 consecutive correct responses. Then I (again giving the participant no warning or 
clue as to what was happening) changed the sorting principle to number. After 10 
consecutive number responses I switched back to colour, and then form and number.
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The test continued either until the participant had completed the six categories, or 
until both decks had been used. At no time did I indicate to the participant that I was 
changing the sorting rule, or gave the participant any information that was not 
contained in the initial instructions.
Scoring
Perserverations (psv) is the number of perseverative responses, in which the 
participant continued sorting by a previously correct category despite negative 
feedback. According to Heaton (1981) this score is the best predictor of prefrontal 
dysfunction derived from the WSCT.
The failure to maintain set score (ftms) is the number of times in the test that the 
participant makes five correct responses in a row but fails to get the 10 that are 
required to complete the category (i.e. runs of five to nine consecutive correct 
responses). When the participant does this, s/he has shown definite insight into the 
correct sorting principle, has almost certainly had unambiguous correct responses 
reinforced, and nevertheless had not been able to consistently use the strategy that has 
been successful.
Categories is the number of categories (colour, shape, number) in which the 
participant correctly made the criterion of 10 consecutive responses.
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Errors are the total number of incorrect responses. The score is the sum of non
perseverative errors and perseverative errors.
4.4c The British Picture Vocabulary Scale
The BP VS is a standardised test of verbal language comprehension. It is widely used 
in developmental psychology research to verbal mental age match control participants 
with autistic participants.
At the beginning of the test, I had to introduce the test and use the training plates by 
saying:
/ want you to look at some pictures with me.
Look at all these pictures on this page.
I will say a word; then I want you to tell me the number of, or point to, the picture 
which best shows the meaning o f  the word. Let's try this one. Tell me the number of, 
or point to, the picture which best tells the meaning o f the word ‘dog’
Good. Now show me man.
Good. Now show me swing.
Now show me sleep.
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NJL I had to remember that with individuals with autism, if I asked them
"Can you show me man? ", they might have replied, "Yes" (Overliteral speech).
If the participant chose the wrong illustration on any training plate, I gave the correct 
choice and explain why it was correct and went onto the next plate.
When I established the desired response, I turned to the correct starting point plate as 
indicated on the Test Record, and said:
Fine! Now I am going to show you some other pictures. Each time I say a word, you 
say the number of, or point to, the picture which best shows the meaning o f the word. 
As we go through the book you may not be sure you know the meaning o f some o f the 
words, but look carefully at all o f  the pictures anyway and choose the one you think 
right.
Rules for Administration
Below are some of the key elements of administering the BPVS. 1
1. I never preceded the stimulus word by an article (a, an, the). This rule was 
established to prevent giving clues, since only nouns are introduced by articles.
2. The participant took any reasonable amount of time per item to make a choice, 
since this is not a test of speed. However, if a minute had passed and no choice 
had been made, I encouraged the participant to choose by saying: Try One. 
Point to the one you think is correct.
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(There was no penalty for guessing, and the participants were informed of this).
3. I always tried to secure a response. Nevertheless, if someone was completely 
unwilling/unable to choose, I recorded NR (no response) on the Individual’s 
Test Record, while making a comment such as:
That is a difficult one. Let’s try another.
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4.5 Bubble Dialogue sessions
Both D. and N. were tested and had the Bubble Dialogue sessions in their own homes. 
P. and W. had the Bubble Dialogue sessions in their school library.
Bubble Dialogue Scenarios
The scenarios, 1 to 6 (p.77 - 82), were given in that sequence.
While I was booting up the program, I asked the participant how he was and what he 
had done during the week and so on. I then produced the floppy disk, with his name 
written on it, and inserted it into the computer and selected the scenario for that 
session.
I then showed the participant the scenario, for that session. The participant read 
through the scenario as often as he wanted. Once we were both ready, I clicked on the 
speech icon for the character I played (I always played the character whose turn it was 
next to speak). After I had typed in the speech bubble what I wanted my character to 
say, I clicked on the thought icon. The speech bubble disappeared and was replaced 
by a thought bubble. I proceeded to type in what my character thought and when I 
had finished I clicked on the participant’s characters speech icon.
When the empty speech icon for the participant’s character appeared, the previous 
speech of my character reappeared. Then the participant had the opportunity to type 
in whatever he wanted. Once he had typed what he wanted to say, I clicked on the
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thought icon for him and a thought bubble appeared to replace the speech bubble. 
Once the participant understood the procedure of clicking on the icons to bring up the 
thought and speech bubbles, I left that task entirely to him.
He and I continued the dialogue until we either ran out of time (because he had 
another activity or lesson to go to) or we exhausted all the avenues to progress our 
dialogue further.
After that I asked the participant if he wanted to review what we had written. If he 
wished to, I clicked the review button and he and I had the opportunity to go back 
through the entire dialogue and change whatever text we wanted to.
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1. Simple Perspective taking (p. 77) 
Understanding sources of informational access 
"seeing leads to knowing"
2. Complex perspective taking (p. 78) 
Understanding implications of physical disability
3. False Belief (p. 79)
Communicating with someone who holds a false belief
4. Deception-Lie (p. 80)
Lying to a parent about your whereabouts
5. Deception-‘W hite’ lie (p. 81) 
Organising a surprise birthday party
6. Making a friend (p. 82) 
Introducing yourself to a stranger
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4.6 Rating of Bubble Dialogue scripts
The speech and thought bubble dialogues for all four participants were converting into 
script form to then be blind rated. The transcribed scripts resemble play scripts or 
screen plays (see Appendix for transcription of all the scripts produced, i.e., all 4 
participants engaged in 6 scenarios). Additionally, the characters’ thoughts were 
italicised, so that the raters could easily differentiate the thoughts from speech.
I recruited 33 blind raters to assess the dialogue scripts. The raters were psychology 
third/final year undergraduates following a course in theory of mind. They knew, in 
advance, that some of the scripts were produced by participants with Asperger’s 
syndrome, but did not know which ones. They were randomly assigned to one of 
three teams (11 in each). Eleven raters rated all the four sets of six scripts 
(4 participants, 6 scenarios), along one of three dimensions:
1. Emotionally charged -  emotionally flat
2. Polite -  coarse
3. Pursuing a topic too little -  pursuing a topic too much
The raters were asked to rate the dialogues of both characters (one of which was 
played by the participant and the other played by the experimenter (myself)) by 
circling one line on a 6 point bi-polar scale (see Appendix for an example).
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The raters were intentionally not given any examples of what constitutes ‘emotionally 
charge or flat’, for instance. The same was tme for the other two dimensions, their 
interpretation was also left open-ended.
I believed that the participants’ scripts ought not to be rated in isolation because the 
discourse was between two people. Therefore, I asked the raters to rate both the 
participants’ scripts and the experimenter’s (my) scripts. They did this by circling one 
of the line points on six point bi-polar scale. There were two scales, one for each 
character. I then subtracted my rated scores from the participants rated score. This 
gave a number which reflected the interaction between both the BD users and was 
correspondingly used in quantitative analysis. This number which was either positive 
or negative, reflected how, for example, emotionally flat or emotionally charged the 
participant’s character was relative to mine. Therefore a negative number indicates 
that the participant was rated emotionally flat relative to me along that particular 
dimension.
After my rated scores had been subtracted from the participant’s rated scores, these 
subtracted ratings where then summed across all six scenarios.
The scripts were all rated in the order of scenarios 1-6 for D, followed by N. P. and 
W, i.e., both the autistic scripts were rated first. This procedure meant that the entire 
rating booklet of approximately fifty pages, (the ordered dialogue scripts and rating 
scales) could be photocopied identically and so reduced the risk of commingling
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scripts and rating scales.
Because the scripts were not randomised, I risked order effects. However, I felt that it 
was more president to accurately compile the rating booklets and more efficiently 
score the 33 scripts. Moreover, many raters reviewed and re-rated the scripts after 
having worked through the booklet.
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Chapter 5 
Results
5.1 Results from the battery of tests given to the participants with Asperger’s 
syndrome both before and after the six Bubble Dialogue sessions.
The results from table 4 below show there is virtually no difference in the VABS 
scores for D. and only a slight difference for N., between their scores before and after 
the Bubble Dialogue sessions. There is very little difference in the BPVS scores 
before and after the Bubble Dialogues sessions for both D. and N. However, both D. 
and N. show a striking improvement in WCST in terms of number of perseverations 
and how many categories they managed to correctly sort. Note that low scores on 
perseverations on the WCST mean improved performance. Note also that the 
maximum number of categories that can be sorted on the WCST is 6. Therefore, any 
increase in number of categories sorted shows an increase in performance on this test.
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Table 4 below shows Vineland Adaptive Behavioural Scales supplementary items 
devised by Frith et al. (1994), Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale score for both the participants with Asperger’s syndrome before and 
after the six Bubble Dialogue sessions.
Test Score: Pre Bubble Dialogues 
For D.
Score: Post Bubble Dialogues 
For D.
VABS
Active score (max 32): 20 20
Interactive score (max 32): 14 14
Executive function
WSCT psv 105 28
WSCT l'tms 0 1
WSCT Categories 2 3
WSCT errors 85 76
WSCT psv errors 83 27
BPVS
Raw score: 123 121
BPVS Verbal mental age: 14-9 12-5
BPVS Verbal IQ: 76 74
(Standardized score)
Test Score: Pre Bubble Dialogues Score: Post Bubble Dialogues
ForN. For N.
VABS
Active score (max 32) 19 21
Interactive score (max 32): 11 9
Executive function
W'SCT psv 65 9
W'SCT ftms 1 0
W’SCT Categories 2 6
W'SCT errors 67 21
W'SCT psv errors 53 9
BPVS
Raw score: 111 122
BPVS Verbal mental age: 12-8 14-7
BPVS Verbal IQ: 64 75
(Standardized score!
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5.2a Results from the blind rating of the Bubble Dialogue Scripts 
Change over time -  for the dimension emotionally flat to emotionally charged
Autistic person 1 (D.) (Boxplot 1)
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Change over time -  for the dimension emotionally flat to emotionally charged
Autistic person 2 (N.) (Boxplot 2)
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Thirty-three blind raters rated the Bubble Dialogue scripts produced by the 4 
participants and myself. They did this by circling one of the line points on six point 
bi-polar scale. There were two scales, one for each character. I then subtracted my 
rated scores from the participants’ rated score. This gave a number which reflected 
the interaction between the participant and myself.
This number which was either positive or negative, reflected how, for example, 
emotionally flat or emotionally charged the participant’s character was relative to 
mine. Therefore a negative number indicates that the participant was rated 
emotionally flat relative to me along that particular dimension.
Both boxplot 1 and boxplot 2, show that there is no pattern of change in rated Bubble 
Dialogue script scores for both N. and D. (along the dimension of emotionally flat- 
emotionally charged), as they progress from the first Bubble Dialogue session to the 
sixth Bubble Dialogue session.
This result suggests that that there was no measured improvement in their simulated 
interpersonal skills with time (as indexed by the number of Bubble Dialogue 
sessions). Therefore, this result corroborates the lack of change in the VABS 
supplementary items scores before and after the Bubble Dialogue sessions.
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Change over tim e -  for the dim ension polite to coarse
Autistic person 1 (D .) fBoxplnt 3)
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Change over time -  for the dimension polite to coarse
Autistic person 2 (N.) (Boxplot 4)
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Both boxplot 3 and boxplot 4, show that there is no pattern of change in rated Bubble 
Dialogue script scores for both N. and D. (along the dimension polite - coarse), as 
they progress from the first Bubble Dialogue session to the sixth Bubble Dialogue
session.
Change over time -  for the dimension pursuing a topic too little to too much 
Autistic person 1 (D.) (Boxplot 5)
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Change over tim e -  for  the dim ension pursuing a topic too little to too much
Autistic person 2 (N.) (Boxplot 6)
TIME1 TIME2 TIME3 TIME4 TIME5 TIME6
Both boxplot 5 and boxplot 6, show that there is no pattern of change in rated Bubble 
Dialogue script scores for both N. and D. (along the dimension pursuing a topic too 
little -  pursuing a topic too much), as they progress from the first Bubble Dialogue 
session to the sixth Bubble Dialogue session.
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5.2b Results from the rated dialogue scripts continued.
(Boxplot7)
Emotionally flat - charged
Participant
After my rated Bubble Dialogue script scores had been subtracted from all the 
participants’ rated scores, these subtracted ratings were then summed across five 
scenarios (rather than all six). Note that the scores for scenario No. 5, for all four 
participants, were not included in the aggregation and subsequent analysis 
because D. only produced one sentence for that scenario.
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The data were analysed using a one way within subjects (repeated measures) 
ANOVA, with four levels: F(3,30) = 14.8, pcO.OOl.
Paired Samples Test (Table 5)
Paired
Differences
Mean
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 ASP1 -  ASP2 -7.6364 -5.000 10 .001
Pair 2 ASP1 -  EBD3 -7.1818 -3.454 10 .006
Pair 3 ASP1 -  EBD4 -9.1818 -4.805 10 .001
Pair 4 ASP2 -  EBD3 .4545 .361 10 .726
Pair 5 ASP2 -  EBD4 -1.5455 -1.741 10 .112
Pair 6 EBD3 -  EBD4 -2.0000 -2.119 10 .060
N.B. for paired comparisons to be significant they had to reach the 0.008 significance 
level (significance level number of pair comparison, i.e., 0.05-H3), Bonferoni Test.
The analysis shows that there is a significant difference between the four individuals. 
Additionally, the paired comparison t-tests reveal that D.’s (Asperger 1) scripts were 
rated as emotionally flat relative to N .’s (Asperger 2) and P.’s (EB3) and W .’s 
(EBD4). Both D. and N. have the same diagnosis (Asperger’s syndrome), but N.’s 
ratings show his dialogue scripts were not rated as significantly different from the two 
individuals with EBD.
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(Boxplot 8)
Polite - coarse
ASP1 ASP2 EBD3 EBD4
Participant
Rater no. 5 omitted to rate scenario 3 for participant EBD4. Hence his/her score was 
estimated by calculating the average (mean) score given for EBD4, by the sum of the 
five other scenarios and dividing by five.
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Within subjects (repeated measures) ANOVA: F(3,30) = 63.1, p<0.001.
Paired Samples Test (Table 6)
Paired
Differences
Mean
t dfSig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 ASP1 - ASP2 -6.8182 -4.963 10 .001
Pair 2 ASP1 - EBD3 -14.0909 -13.668 10 <.001
Pair 3 ASP1 - EBD4 -12.0000 -12.000 10 <.001
Pair 4 ASP2 - EBD3 -7.2727 -5.682 10 <.001
Pair 5 ASP2 - EBD4 -5.1818 -5.391 10 <.001
Pair 6 E B D 3- EBD4 2.0909 2.101 10 .062
N.B. for paired comparisons to be significant they had to reach the 0.008 significance 
level (significance level -r number of pair comparison, i.e., 0.05-H3), Bonferoni Test.
The analysis shows that there is a significant difference between the four individuals 
and that both D. and N. are rated as more polite than both the EBD participants. 
However the paired comparison t-tests reveal that only EBD3 and EBD4 are non 
significant (i.e., they are alike).
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(Boxplot 9)
Pursuing a topic too little - too much
Participant
Raters nos. 3 and 4 did not complete rating all the scripts, so their entire ratings for the 
dimension ‘pursuing a topic too little - pursuing a topic too much’ were discounted.
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Within subjects (repeated measures) ANOVA: F(3,24) = 11.268, pcO.OOl.
Paired Samples Test (Table 7)
Paired
Differences
Mean
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 ASP1 - ASP2 -10.0000 -3.625 8 .007
Pair 2 ASP1 - EBD3 -11.6667 -5.433 8 .001
Pair 3 ASP1 - EBD4 -9.4444 -4.839 8 .001
Pair 4 A SP2- EBD3 -1.6667 -.652 8 .532
Pair 5 ASP2 - EBD4 .5556 .216 8 .834
Pair 6 EB D 3- EBD4 2.2222 3.468 8 .008
N.B. for paired comparisons to be significant they had to reach the 0.008 significance 
level (significance level -r number of pair comparison, i.e., 0.05-^6), Bonferoni Test.
The analysis shows that there is significant difference between the four individuals. 
However the paired comparison t-tests reveals that, based on the relative rating of his 
scripts, D. (Asperger 1) was rated as significantly pursuing a topic too little compared 
with N. (Asperger 2) and P. (EBD3) and W. (EBD4). Both D. and N. have the same 
diagnosis (Asperger’s syndrome), but N .’s rating shows his dialogue scripts were not 
rated as significantly different from the two individuals with EBD. The paired 
comparison t-tests also reveal that the script ratings for P. (EBD3) and W. (EBD4) 
were on the cusp of a being significantly different.
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During the very first Bubble Dialogue session (scenario 1, ‘Jane and Paul’), when the 
very first thought bubble appeared, D. said, " I don’t know what Jane is thinking 
Below is an extract from the Bubble Dialogue scripts from scenario 1, between D. and 
myself. D. plays Jane and I play Paul.
5 3  Q ualitative A nalysis
5 3 a  D. (A sperger 1J
Jane says: " Yes I do "
Paul says: " Do you like your chocolate milkshake
then Jane."
P a u l thinks: " J a n e’s  question  is rea lly  silly. H ow
cou ld  I  know  w hat drink she bought 
w hen  /  w as in a  different queue?"
Paul says: " Mine is a strawberry shake. ‘
It’s my favourite."
P a u l thinks: " A ctu a lly  I  rea lly  like chocolate shakes
a s  w ell. /  w ish  I  cou ld  try  som e o f  
Ja n e’s."
Jane says: " I don’t like Chocolate Milkshake.
My favourite is Vanilla."
Jane thinks: " I am  go in g  to  b u y  a  Chicken Burger."
From the extract, Jane’s speech and thought are very lacking in affect relative to Paul. 
Paul seems to be doing all the conversational ‘work’ and selecting avenues to continue 
with the interaction. Jane does not ask any questions and questioning is a 
conversational device which shows reciprocity and elicits responses.
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From the outset, D. seemed to understand the comic book format of the program when 
D. said that it was, " hard to do comics because people who do Judge Dread (an 
established science fiction comic) do it because they have a creative imagination
D. mentioned that at school he found it hard to write a story, so he asked his sister to 
write it for him. He said it was because, " I have not got much of a creative 
imagination." D. said that it was hard to write stories because you have to make it up 
and he said that it was also true for writing for programmes like Eastenders or 
Brookside (both are long running terrestrial TV channel soap operas in the UK) 
because they are not real life. D. continued by saying that those programmes were not 
boring either. He said it was interesting how they make (presumable by ‘they’ he 
meant the programme makers) the story carry on. He asked me how people who 
make Eastenders and Brookside carry the storyline on. He asked me if they just made 
it up.
D. typed text into the speech bubbles for all the characters he played. However, D. 
seemed to find it very difficult to type what his character was thinking. Therefore he 
frequently did not type anything in the thought bubbles. D. often asked me, " should I 
write ‘I don’t know’ ?", in the thought bubbles. I replied, " It is up to you what you 
write ".
100
As we progressed through the scenarios, D. seemed to find it increasingly difficult to
type even speech. For example in scenario 3 ( Tricia and Sue) both characters are 
chatting in a pub. When D. seemed to get stuck on this scenario, I eventually 
prompted him with some ideas about what to write: "What do people drink?", "What 
would they chat about? ". I played Tricia and D. played Sue.
Tricia says: " That is funny because I was
so sure that my lighter was in my bag Sue."
Tricia thinks: " I  d o n ’t  m in d  Sue b orrow in g  m y  
ligh ter , b u t I  w ish  sh e p u t it  back  
w h ere  sh e  g o t  i t  from ."
Sue says: " la m  going to buy a pint of Cider."
Tricia says: " Are you planning on getting 
drunk Sue? If you are having 
a pint of Cider then so will I."
Tricia thinks: " Sue can  b e  such  a  b a d  influence  
on m e, bu t sh e  is m y  b e s t m ate."
Sue says: " Yes, I am planning on getting drunk. 
I drink Cider like water."
Tricia says: " I know you do, but I get drunk 
very easily. Anyway I thought you 
hated cider and were a beer drinker? "
Tricia thinks: " 1 re a lly  a d m ire  Sue becau se  sh e  can  
drin k  so  m u ch ."
Sue says: " I like Cider because it has a sweet 
taste. I don’t much like beer much 
because it has a bitter taste."
Tricia says: " You know how bad for you smoking is? 
Have you every thought about giving up?"
Tricia thinks: " I w an t to  g iv e  up sm oking, bu t Sue 
m igh t not th ink I am  co o l an ym ore i f  I  do."
101
Sue says: " Yes, I do know how bad smoking is. 
I have thought about giving up, but I 
will carry on smoking for some time."
In session 5, D. was quite negative about things in his life and found it frustrating 
because he could not think of anything to type. In fact he only typed one sentence for 
scenario 5. Therefore, I decided to start scenario 6 during that session. D. seemed to 
find it easier to think of things to say, for his character, for that scenario and his 
confidence returned
In the example below D. also showed some evidence of impulse control. Jane is 
played by D. and Paul is played by myself.
Paul says: " I’ve run out of money Jane. May I
borrow some from you and I promise to 
pay it back?"
P a u l thinks: " I f  I  leave  it  long enough, m aybe Jane
w ill fo rg e t that I ow e her som e money."
Jane says: " O.K. how much money do you want."
Paul says: " £1.50 will be enough thanks."
The dialogue shows that D. plays his character correctly by not acting on the 
information that resides in the deceiving private thoughts of my character
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The very first question N. asked me when we started the first Bubble Dialogue session 
was, " Can you do it in German? (One of N .’s obsessions is German. He can read, 
write and speak the language).
Eventually on the final dialogue scenario 6 (Katie and Tony), N. played a native 
German who spoke in English, but thought in German. Originally his character 
started to think in English, but in review mode he erased all the thoughts written in 
English and replaced them with German.
N.’s character’s thoughts (in brackets) were translated by myself and edited by a 
Dutch postgraduate research student who spoke German.
5 3b  N. (A sperger 2 )
T ony thinks: " G olt im H im m el! H ier ist mein
gluckiche N acht.
O H H JA ! "
(G o d  in H eaven! This is m y lucky 
night, O H  YES!).
Katie says: " You’re very quiet Tony.
What are you gong to drink?"
K atie thinks: " /  h o p e  h e is  n o t to o  shy.
I w o n d er  w h a t h e  is thinking."
Tony says: " I’d like a nice, errr, oh I’m sorry I feel
somewhat shy about what’s in for me."
T ony thinks: " M ein  G luck hat rech!"
(M y luck is in!)
Katie says: " Don’t be shy Tony. I know I’m
very chatty but I’m quite a shy person inside."
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K atie thinks: " I t ’s  n ice  to  m eet a  m an  w ho d o e s  n o t ju s t  
ta lk  a b o u t s p o r t  a n d  h im se lf  a ll  the tim e."
Tony says: " Did you know I’m German, actually 
I’m from the small province of the 
Rhine. Can you speak German at all, I 
love to here you speak German have a 
go?
T ony thinks: " Ich hojfee, dass s ie  D eutch  sprechen
kann, o d er son st fa h re  ich nach  
D eutsch land. Ohh bitte, sag  doch  
etwas!"
( I hope th a t she can speak  Germ an, 
o th erw ise  I  w ill go  to  G erm any. Oh 
p le a se , s a y  som ething!).
As N. and I progress through the first session, he said, " It’s good this, it makes you 
think about thinking."
In contrast to the Bubble Dialogue sessions with D., N. and I would often laugh 
spontaneously about what our characters’ wrote. While we were engaged in scenario 
1, N. said, " I ’m really enjoying this. I would like to do this all day. Before I wanted 
to do German all day. Now I want to do this
During the third session (Scenario 3, Tricia and Sue), N. said, " I would not say this 
normally, but in thought this is what many people might put. This is the first time that 
I have used it. If you don’t mind " (This is when N ’s character Sue thinks, "Fuck 
see extract below).
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I replied to N., " You can put whatever you want
N. said, " This is very good because it expressed what people think and how they cope 
with arguments and things
I replied, " It is not you, it is the character you are playing
N. said, "You [Experimenter] can express yourself in the same way if you
want " (i.e., my character could swear).
I replied, " No, I ’m going to play it differently as a contrast 
N. said, " It is going to make me look bad 
I said, "No it is going to make her [Sue] look bad
Tricia says: " Okay, calm down.
Let’s not fight over something trivial. 
How about a drink? "
Tricia thinks " I re a lly  like  Sue, hut so m etim es she an noys  
m e b ec a u se  sh e  is  in the w ron g  an d  
g e ts  u pset w ith  me."
Sue says: " If only you’re responsible for what
had damn well happened?!!!!! "
Sue th inks: " F U C K  IT! I wish p eo p le  w ould  stop
being so  indespicable!"
Tricia says: " Fine let’s forget the whole thing.
To show how considerate I am, I’ll buy 
tire first round. What do you want to drink? "
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While N. and I were doing scenario 5 (James and Scott), N. called me by my 
character’s name, playfully saying, 'Thanks James". Jones (1996) states that one of 
the strengths of Bubble Dialogue is its use as a tool for emotional expression. Jones 
(1996) found that some participants identified with their on-screen character by typing 
the personal pronoun ‘I ’. In the above occurrence, N. demonstrated that he 
comprehended my two identities: as character on-screen and as player in real life by 
using the my character’s name, James, to refer to me in real life. N. showed that he 
identified with character’s on-screen because he was able to take those roles out of the 
screen and into real life.
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53c P. (EBP 3J
In contrast to D. and N., I unfortunately had very little time to spend with and get to 
know both P. and W.
I was left with the impression that both P. and W. really enjoyed the Bubble Dialogue 
experience. They both seemed to find it very liberating and I think it facilitated the 
building of a relationship between us.
Below is an extract from Scenario 5 (James and Scott). Scott is played by P. and 
James is played by myself.
Scott says: " i know that sarah will be exited but
what is the fucking matter with you."
S co tt th inks: " he w o rries  too m uch ..... the fucking
arsshole."
James says: " All right. W e’ll do things your way,
but you can lie to her because I am not."
Jam es thinks: " /  th ink m a y b e  I n eed  n o t w o rry  so  much."
P.’s characters were often very aggressive, coarse and usually evoked a strong 
response from my character. However, at no point did P. or I feel any animosity 
between us in real life because there was always an emotional distance provided by 
the computer.
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5.3d W. (EBP 4)
W. played equally aggressive, but not quite as coarse characters as P. and in scenario 
3 (Tricia and Sue) W. showed appreciation for an act of friendship. In this extract 
from scenario 3, Sue is played by W. and I played Tricia.
Tricia says: " That’s okay you can borrow my 
lighter anytime. Do you fancy a drink? "
Tricia thinks: " I w ish  th at Sue w o u ld  p u t th ings  
hack w h ere  sh e  g o t them  from ."
Sue says: " thankyou that is nice.you do not mind"
Sue thinks: " i wish she w ou ld  ask  me fo r  a  drink. "
Tricia says: " I’ll buy the first round. 
Do you want Cider, Beer, 
or a Vodka and Orange? "
Tricia thinks: " I re a lly  like  Sue b ecau se  she  
can d rin k  a s  m uch  a s  me."
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Chapter 6
Discussion
" Education costs money, but then so does ignorance. "
(Sir Claus Moser)
6.1 Does the Bubble Dialogue experience bring about anv change in 
interpersonal understanding in adults with Asperger’s syndrome?
From the results it seems that the experience of Bubble Dialogue, presented through 
six theory of mind inspired scenarios, did not induce a detectable change in 
interpersonal understanding as measured by Frith et al.’s (1994) supplementary VABS 
items. The lack of change in interpersonal understanding, as indicated by the VABS 
scores, is supported by the blind ratings of the emotionally flat to emotionally charged 
dimension for both D. and N. These ratings show no increase in relative emotional 
'chargedness’ from session 1 to session 6 for both participants with Asperger’s 
syndrome which suggests D. and N. have shown no improvement in this dimension 
over time, with increased experience with Bubble Dialogue.
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The results could be interpreted in four ways,
1. The experience of Bubble Dialogue produced an improvement in interpersonal 
understanding, but was too weak to be detected by the supplementary VABS 
items.
2. The VABS is not a sensitive enough measure to detect/pick up any such 
change, despite being a widely used clinical tool.
3. That both D. and N.already possessed the ability to mentalize and so the 
Bubble Dialogue experience was of no further benefit to them.
4. That D. and N. do not have the ability to mentalize and that the experience of 
Bubble Dialogue did not help improve their interpersonal understanding.
The supplementary item VABS scores, for both D. and N., were very similar in 
comparison with the children with autism who participated in Frith et al.’s (1994) 
study. In their investigation, children who passed the first and second order theory of 
mind tasks scored a mean of 20 for active sociability (behaviours that could be 
performed without the ability to mentalize) and 8.8 for interactive sociability 
(behaviours which supposedly could not be performed without the ability to 
mentalize). Only three of the autistic passers had moderately high interactive scores 
(11, 15 and 22, out of a maximum of 32).
Before and after the Bubble Dialogue experience, D. scored the same for both active 
and interactive sociability: 20 and 14 respectively. Before the Bubble Dialogue 
experience N. scored 19 and 11 for active and interactive sociability respectively and
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after the BD experience scored 21 and 9. Therefore D. and N. may be amongst the 
‘talented minority’ and hence were able to mentalize in everyday life prior to the 
experience of Bubble Dialogue
6.2 Is it better to teach rules for understanding others’ mental states or is it 
better to learn bv experience: role taking via simulation?
The results leave this question still unanswered because Hadwin et al. (1996, 1997) 
found that rule based teaching did not bring about a generalised improvement in non- 
taught areas and the results of this experiment did not reveal any improvement in 
interpersonal understanding.
However, N., P. and W. often said how much they enjoyed the Bubble Dialogue 
experience and I (as the experimenter) found it very engaging too. Therefore in 
addition to being interactive, Bubble Dialogue provides a very humanistic and non 
socially threatening way to engage role-play and experience other people’s 
perspectives.
It is interesting to note how both D. and N. viewed the sessions. N. thought that he 
was engaged in something very psychological (and perhaps a foim of therapy) 
because when a house mate of his interrupted us during one session, N. said to h im ,11 
Excuse me, we are doing some psychology work here ".
I l l
D. in contrast saw the sessions as a piece of creative English language work. At first 
he believed that the Bubble Dialogue experience would provide him with a creative 
imagination, but as he and I progressed to the latter sessions he became increasingly 
disillusioned as he realised that this was not going to happen.
Both adolescent men with EBD also became very engaged with Bubble Dialogue. 
They seemed to enjoy the open-ended nature of the program which enabled them to 
play characters that did not have to conform to any of the social mles that they 
themselves probably had to observe at school. Their characters could say and think 
anything they wanted. Both P. and W. asked me for copies of their scripts to keep.
6.2a What does the experience of using the Bubble Dialogue program and the 
Bubble Dialogue scripts tell us about autism?
During the Bubble Dialogue sessions, D. articulated that he wished he had a creative 
imagination. Leslie (1988, 1991) argues that the ability to pretend, which depends 
upon imagination, is probably the most basic form of understanding about 
metarepresentation. Accordingly, pretence is importantly and inextricably linked 
with the attribution of mental states to other people (Leslie 1988, 1991). Moreover, 
Harris (1991) states that it is imagination that facilitates the ability to put oneself in 
someone else’s position, so it could be argued that it is imagination that drives the 
ability to mentalize.
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Therefore, if imagination and pretence form the basis of a representational theory of 
mind and Bubble Dialogue intrinsically necessitates the use of imagination to role 
play, then this capacity ought to be better reflected in the VABS scores. Although D. 
was disappointed in his own inadequate ability, both D. and N. had sufficient 
imagination to engage in Bubble Dialogue. According to Leslie’s (1988, 1991) and 
Harris’s (1991) theories, both D. and N. have the ability to mentalize.
Consequentially, it could be argued that Frith et al.’s (1994) supplementary VABS 
items do not provide a sensitive measure of mentalizing in everyday life.
Hadwin et al. (1996) found that the pretence group in their study showed no 
significant improvement in their production of spontaneous play, which suggests that 
rule-based teaching of mental states does not influence the imaginative and pretending 
capacity of individuals with autism.
It is probably the case that the kind of experience engendered in Bubble Dialogue 
offers a better opportunity to improve imagination than mle-based teaching.
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6.2b Are individuals with Asperger’s syndrome capable of metarepresentation?
While N. and I were engaged in scenario 4 (James and Scott), N. called me by my 
character’s name. He said to me, 'Thanks James". In this example, N. actually labels 
me with the name of an on-screen character. N. did not confuse my real identity with 
the character’s identity, and so it seems that he understood that I had two 
representations: the character on screen and person playing the character. N.’s 
identification of both my roles seems in direct contradiction to Leslie’s dysfunctional 
metarepresentational device theory of autism because it could be argued that to play 
Bubble Dialogue, users have to comprehend that the on-screen characters and the 
individuals playing the character are metarepresentations and primary representations 
respectively.
According to Leslie (1988, 1991), the inability to pretend X is Y arises because of 
failure in autism to 'decouple’ the pretend identity of ‘X’ from the primary identity 
' Y \ D. and N. appear to have no such difficulty because they both are able to role- 
play characters and by that virtue are able be both themselves and their on-screen 
characters.
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6 3  Blind ratings of the Bubble Dialogue scripts
The Bubble Dialogue scripts and the participants’ comments are insightful and 
interesting in themselves. However the objective analysis required a method to 
analyse the scripts quantitatively.
Autism remains an enigmatic disorder and the adjective ‘autistic’ still requires further 
complete definition. The blind rating of these autistic scripts offers the opportunity 
for an insight into the speech and perhaps more interestingly the thought of people 
with autism. Of course the underlying assumption is that the participants with autism 
conduct their characters in a similar way in which they function themselves.
Another way of investigating this would be to work ‘backwards’, by asking blind 
raters to describe the Bubble Dialogue scripts and then construct dimensions based on 
the raters’ adjectives and comments. For example, one group of blind raters might be 
asked to list all the adjectives that they would use to describe the dialogues produced 
by the participants with Asperger’s syndrome. Next, a second set of blind raters 
would be asked if they agreed with the adjectives chosen by the first rater group.
Then we could start to quantify the degree of inter-rater agreement and select those 
adjectives with highest degree of agreement and use them to form the rating 
dimensions for a third set of blind raters. This procedure would allow us to further 
investigate what the adjective ‘autistic’ means.
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This method could form the basis of another investigation using the Bubble Dialogue 
scripts from the current study and future studies.
6.4 The method of analysis
Bubble Dialogue is a program where typically two users interact. Hence, one player’s 
character’s rated scores are going to reflect the interaction between both the users’ 
characters.
The method used in this study involves the subtraction of the experimenter’s (my) 
rated scores from the participants’ rated scores. This produces a number which 
reflects the interaction between both the Bubble Dialogue users, a numerical value 
which can then be used in quantitative analysis.
For example, this number may represent how emotionally charged a participant’s 
character is relative to my character. A negative number means that their character 
was rated less emotionally charged than my character. A positive number means that 
their character was rated more emotionally charged than my character.
The methods of,
1. using blind raters and
2. formulating a numerical value which represents an interaction between two 
people,
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are both potentially useful because they are methods that could be applied to 
qualitative transcriptions from any source. For instance it could be used to investigate 
scaffolding in teacher-child collaborative learning, e.g., if/how teachers ‘teach’ 
children the private/public distinction between thoughts and speech. Blind raters 
could be asked to assess teacher-child Bubble Dialogue scripts for leakage from 
thought of person A to speech of person B as if the thought of person A were not 
private and subjective.
6.5 What do the blind ratings show?
The blind rating analyse, in the three dimensions, show that although both D. and N. 
have the same diagnostic label of Asperger’s syndrome, the Bubble Dialogue scripts 
they produced were rated differently from each other. N.’s scripts adduced ratings 
that were not significantly different from both adolescents with EBD, along the 
emotionally flat-charged dimension and pursing a topic.
Does this mean that N. was incorrectly diagnosed? This seems unlikely. The rating 
differences perhaps highlight that even individuals with the more specific autistic 
label of Asperger’s syndrome can vary, and Bubble Dialogue could elicit social 
interactions indistinguishable from other populations.
It is important to note that autism is usually diagnosed after looking at an individual’s 
developmental history rather than a ‘snapshot’ of their profile at one point in time.
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The blind rating analysis also highlights how similar, though in different ways, the 
adolescents with EBD are in comparison with at least one individual with autism. 
Arguably normal controls are needed to further emphasize the differences and 
similarities between individuals with autism and individuals with EBD.
6.5a Emotionally charged -  emotionally flat
The results from the analysis for both D. and N. support Hobson’s socio-affective 
theory and Kanner’s original clinical observations that individuals with autism are 
impaired in their social and emotional connectedness because the Bubble Dialogues 
D. and N. produced were rated as being the most relatively emotionally flat of the four 
participants. Moreover, their rated level of emotionality did not change with 
increased exposure to Bubble Dialogue.
6.5b Polite -  coarse
These results show that despite their lack of affect some individuals with Asperger’s 
syndrome can be viewed as polite. This raises the interesting question, "Can a person 
be truly polite if s/he does not have the ability to mentalize?". I argue that in order to 
be truly polite an individual needs the capacity to impute mental states to others, 
otherwise being polite is merely a behaviourally learned response to a set of social 
cues.
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6.5c Pursuing a topic too little -  pursuing a topic too much
The ‘Pursuing a topic’ dimension was designed to tap into autistic perseveration. 
However, the raters rated D .’s character as pursuing a topic too little relative to my 
character.
Therefore this dimension may have been picking up how lacking in social reciprocity 
D.’s character was being relative to my character. Accordingly, the raters might have 
viewed and rated D .’s character as not being sensitive or responsive enough.
Indeed perseveration may not be a characteristic of individuals with Asperger’s 
syndrome who show normal scores on the WCST (as D. and N. do on post-test), 
because according to Shallice (1988) individuals who do not show frontal lobe patient 
scoring on the WCST have an intact Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) (Norman 
and Shallice, 1986).
The SAS allows the individual to change a program once it starts running.
Shallice (1988) uses this computational analogy to illustrate that perserverative 
scoring on the WCST indicates that once an internal program has been fixed or set 
(i.e., sort by colour) it cannot be changed because of damage to the SAS.
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6.6 Are there any other questions that could be answered bv using the same 
blind rater method?
When using Bubble Dialogue, thoughts (which are normally private and hidden) 
become public and visible and so typically two users have access to the thoughts of 
each others’ character. In short, the users are able to mindread. If a user plays their 
character ‘correctly’, then their character will not act upon the knowledge that resides 
in the private thoughts of the other user’s character. However, the user’s 
informational access to thoughts may unwittingly or knowingly be fed into the verbal 
responses of the user’s character.
A possible way to capture and quantify this complex process could be to ask blind 
raters to assess whether there is leakage from thought of person A to speech of person 
B as if the thought of person A were not private and subjective.
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6.7 Control measures
The control measures in the study were the British Picture Vocabulary Scale and the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
The results show very little difference in the BPVS scores before and after the Bubble 
Dialogues sessions for both D. and N. However, D. and N. show a striking 
improvement in WCST in terms of a reduction in the number of perseverations and an 
increase in the number of categories they managed to correctly sort.
What does this mean, given that WSCT is thought to be a measure of perseveration 
(Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996)? There 3 questions worth considering.
1 Is there a general improvement in overall functioning?
This seems unlikely because the BPVS scores are stable for D. and N. both 
before and after the Bubble Dialogue experience. This suggests that there was 
no increase in overall cognitive function as a result of the Bubble Dialogue 
experience nor was there any global ‘across the board’ increase in cognitive 
function arising from developmental changes.
2 Have D. and N. learned a strategy for overcoming their perseverations? If so 
what is this strategy?
How could D. and N. overcome perseverating? Could it be that they used their 
memory in some way? (Note that good rote memories make up part of the
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Asperger’s syndrome profile). D. and N. could have worked out a strategy for 
remembering the WSCT, but how?
3 Did the Bubble Dialogue experience bring about the change in WSCT scores?
A way to have tested the above three points, would be to have used The Behavioural 
Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS ) (Wilson et al., 1996) which 
according to Evans, Chua, McKenna and Wilson (1997) is ecologically valid test of 
executive function.
If D. and N. improved on the BADS as well as the WSCT then perhaps the conclusion 
would be that their executive function did improve as a result of the Bubble Dialogue 
experience.
However, if they improved on the WSCT, but did not improve on the BADS, then it 
could be that their executive function has not improved but they are utilising, learning 
and applying strategies from their memory of their previous encounter/testing with the 
WCST.
It is impossible to know whether the improvement in the WSCT scores was a tme 
effect of the Bubble Dialogue experience, or if it was simply due to the effect of 
practice/memory. The only way to determine this would be to have given D. and N. 
the WCST more than once before the dialogues (AABA, i.e, give D. and N. more than
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one pre-Bubble Dialogue baseline). We could re-test them now and see if the effect 
has worn off (rather like in a drug paradigm). However, the change in the learning of 
the WCST could be permanent.
If there was no improvement in the BADS between the two pre-dialogue 
administrations, and if improvement then occurred only after the dialogues, this would 
provide evidence that the higher WCST scores really were due to the Bubble Dialogue 
experience.
Ferland, Ramsay, Engeland and O ’Hara (1998) found that clinically normal male 
participants showed little evidence of gaining in performance after repeat (two) 
administrations of the WCST. Ferland et a l’s (1998) normal male group (n=22) 
scored a mean of 11.0 perseverative responses on the first administration of the test 
and 6.6 on the second administration. The group sorted a mean of 5.7 categories on 
the first administration and 6.0 categories on the second. Neither of these results 
were statistically significant which suggests that the WCST scores are robust over 
administrations.
In comparison, D. made 105 perseverative responses and sorted 2 categories before 
the Bubble Dialogue sessions. He made 28 perseverative responses and sorted 3 
categories after the Bubble Dialogue sessions.
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N. made 65 perseverative responses and sorted 2 categories before the Bubble 
Dialogue session. He made 9 perseverative responses and sorted 6 categories after the 
Bubble Dialogue sessions.
Ferland et al.’s (1998) results show how ‘prefrontal’ both D. and N .’s scores were 
prior to the Bubble Dialogue intervention, in comparison to normal males. Yet 
strikingly, post Bubble Dialogue, N .’s scores were almost identical to Ferland et al.’s 
(1998) normal male group.
It could be argued that testing clinically normal individuals with the WCST might 
result in ceiling effects on the number of perseverations because the typical clinical 
procedure in the WCST is to continue the test until six categories are sorted. Ferland 
et al. (1998) neatly ruled out this possibility by analysing their results in two ways,
i. based on the responses made up to completing six categories for all 128 
responses, whichever came first (which is the procedure used in this study and 
in clinical practice).
ii. based on all 128 responses for all participants.
Even when the experimenters analysed their results based on all 128 responses, they 
found no significant decrease in perseverative response from the first to the second 
administration.
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Therefore, although it cannot be concluded that the Bubble Dialogue experience 
produced an improvement in executive function in the participants with Asperger’s 
syndrome, Ferland et a l’s (1998) results suggest that this explanation cannot be mled 
out either.
6.8a Does Bubble Dialogue provide a link between Theory of Mind and 
Executive function?
Returning to Norman and Shallice’s (1986) Supervisory Attentional System model, it 
could be argued that aspects of Bubble Dialogue require executive function resources 
because the,
"SAS is construed as being necessary for effective control of action in a number of 
situations: situations that involve planning or decision making; situations that involves 
error correction or troubleshooting; situations where responses are not well learned or 
contain novel sequences of actions; situations judged to be dangerous or technically 
difficult; and finally situations that require the overcoming of strong habitual response 
or resisting temptation."
(Evans et al., 1997, p. 636)
When using Bubble Dialogue, thoughts (which are normally private and hidden) 
become public and visible and so the users have access to the thoughts of each other’s 
character. The users are literally able to mindread. If a user plays their character
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‘correctly’, then their character will not act upon the knowledge that resides in the 
private thoughts of the other user’s character. This ability requires the 
inhibition/impulse control of actions that might stem from knowledge acquired from 
the other user’s character’s thoughts.
Additionally, using Bubble Dialogue effectively needs flexibility of thought and 
action and it requires planning in how next to progress the dialogue.
6.8b Is the development of Executive function the precursor to the development 
of a Theory of Mind?
Speculatively, it could be that development in executive function precedes changes in 
mentalizing and that is why D. and N. showed improved scores in the test of executive 
function (WCST). There might be a time lag before we see parallel improvements in 
the supplementary VABS items (the measure of mentalizing in everyday life).
This raises a cardinal question in contemporary developmental psychology: how is 
executive function related to theory of mind? Ozonoff et al. (1991a) list four 
explanations of how deficits in the two may be related:
1. one deficit is primary and causes the other, which is secondary,
2. one deficit is primary, but does not cause the other which is a correlated deficit 
caused by brain damage to a neuroanatomically proximal system,
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3. a third deficit is primary and causes both executive function and theory of mind 
impairments,
4. both executive function and theory of mind deficits are independent primary 
deficits of autism.
Pemer (1997) argues that actions are as based on intention and therefore some higher 
order desire/want/need antecedes the planning and organisation required for that goal 
to be attained. Consequently, Pemer (1997) states that a theory of mind is prerequisite 
to executive function. Pem er uses Ozonoff et al.’s (1991) term Executive Function as 
a generic term for both Badderley’s (1990) Central Executive and Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) Supervisory Attentional System. However, Pemer does not 
acknowledge the link between cognitive and sensorimotor expressions of executive 
function.
Denkla (1996a) lists four elements of executive function: initiating, sustaining, 
shifting and inhibition/stopping. Denkla (1996b) suggests that executive function may 
be considered as metacognitive, but that it ought to remain close to its clinical 
neurology roots of motor praxis or ‘execution’ in for example motor sequencing tasks 
(Denkla, 1996b).
According to O ’Neill and Jones (1997) individuals with autism, across the autistic 
spectrum , exhibit stereotypic perseverations (e.g., coin spinning). Furthermore, 
O’Neill and Jones (1997) counsel against attempts to systematically investigate one
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aspect of autism in isolation because such a stance does not reflect the complexity and 
multidimensionality o f human behaviour. Hence Pemer’s narrow view' of executive 
function fails to integrate other non cognitive characteristics, i.e., movement disorders 
associated with autism (Bauman, 1992; Maurer and Damasio; Wing and Attwood, 
1987).
This argument cannot be made against Russell (1996) who advocates that theory of 
mind tests rely on executive function abilities. Russell’s (1996) position both 
accommodates and is compatible with the theoretical integration of the motor features 
of autism with its cognitive characteristics.
If D. and N. show improvements in executive function before improvements in 
mentalizing then the data would support Russell’s (1996) position and any temporal 
relationship between improvements in executive function and improvement in 
mentalizing would indicate the direction of causality.
A way to test this would be to interview D. and N .’s carers again, at a future point, 
with Frith et al.’s (1994) supplementary items for the Vineland Adaptive Behavioural 
Scales. If it was found that after some time both D. and N. were rated as showing 
increased mentalizing, then it would suggest that before an individual develops the 
ability to represent mental states they first develop the ability to plan and execute the 
actions, i.e., actions before intentions.
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6.9 Conclusion
The results of my work suggest that future research needs to be directed at developing 
simulation/experiential interventions, and investigating their efficacy, for individuals 
with Asperger’s syndrome rather than rule teaching-based programmes. The use of 
computer software, like Bubble Dialogue, provides an engaging and humanistic way 
of facilitating this.
The methodology of using blind raters, developed in this study, is a technique that can 
be applied to other investigations; i.e., experiments where it would be valuable to 
obtain blind, third party, descriptive measures of participant produced scripts from any 
source.
*
Additionally, more research needs to be carried out detailing the cognitive 
neuropsychology of autism and using the executive function paradigm to provide a 
more complete theoretical picture of autism.
I advocate that this future research needs to support an evidence based paradigm shift 
to integrate both the cognitive and sensorimotor profiles of autism.
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